National Bats in Russian
Volunteers for the war in Ukraine are being recruited across the country through various channels as part of a coordinated covert mobilization campaign. People are invited to join private military companies (includingdirectly in penal colonies ), as well as various divisions of the "DNR" and "LNR" and, in fact, into official law enforcement agencies: units and formations of the Armed Forces, the National Guard and the subordinated Ministry of Defense of the Combat Army country reserve (BARS).
Another mechanism for attracting manpower stands apart – the creation of registered volunteer battalions in the constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Russian propaganda firmly linked the expressions “national” or “nationalist battalion” (nationalist battalion) and “volunteer battalion” (dobrobat) to Ukrainian paramilitary units that arose in the initial period of the war in Donbass with pro-Russian separatists. These, in particular, included the Azov, Donbass, Aidar, Dnepr and other battalions, created on a territorial basis and staffed, among other things, by members of right-wing radical political movements and football ultras. They were called National Battalions because of the widespread nationalist, and in some cases, neo-fascist views among the personnel and command of the battalions. Be that as it may, there are no national battalions in Ukraine for a long time. The notorious “Azov” battalion and the rest of the volunteer battalions were transformed into ordinary military units and integrated into the Ukrainian security forces – the Armed Forces of Ukraine and the National Guard – or simply disbanded. But now the national battalions, like mushrooms after the rain, appear in the Russian regions.
In Russia, the national battalion, or national battalion, has a slightly different meaning: it is a military unit formed from volunteers in some national autonomy on the principles of ethnic homogeneity or common origin. Volunteer battalions are also formed in “Russian” subjects, that is, in ordinary regions and territories, but even there, compatriotism and an appeal to a common regional identity are used as an ideological basis. It is assumed that one or even several battalions will appear in each of the 85 subjects. According to The Insider, at least 44 Russian regions, including 12 national subjects, have already created such units or announced the recruitment of volunteers in them. In total, 73 local battalions are known, including 23 in national subjects.
In all battalions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation, “nominal” names and a clear territorial binding on an ethnic or compatriot basis are used.
For example, the tasks of the Tiger battalion, which is being recruited in the Primorsky Territory, were described by the local governor Oleg Kozhemyako as helping fellow fellow soldiers participating in the war. The battalion is formed with the help of officers of the 155th Separate Marine Guards Brigade (155 Brigade), stationed in Vladivostok.
Battalions of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation are formed on an ethnic or compatriot basis
The set of symbolic images and historical narratives that are used in the formation of regional battalions is extremely curious. Say, the Yakut battalion is called "Botur" in honor of the mythical ancestor of all Yakuts. The Toyan battalion from the Tomsk region was named after the prince of the Eushta Tatars, who lived in the 17th century along the banks of the Tom River.
One of the battalions assembled in the Republic of Mordovia was named after the Mordovian hero Siyazhar. In neighboring Mari El, three battalions at once bear the names of the defenders of the Mari land: Eden, Poltysh and Akpatr. Moreover, Poltish is a real historical character, the Mari prince who defended his native lands from the Russian troops of Tsar Ivan the Terrible.
Bashkortostan took a different path and turned to the memory of the Great Patriotic and Chechen wars. One of the Bashkir battalions received the name of the newly-born hero of the Second World War, General Minigali Shaimuratov, and the other – Alexander Dostavalov, a participant in the second Chechen war.
In the "Russian" subjects, the names for battalions are mainly associated with local toponymy and history. In the Kirov region, the historical name of the Vyatka region for the battalion was modified into "Vyatka". In the Khabarovsk Territory, the "Baron Korf" battalion refers to the first governor of the Amur region, Baron Andrei Korf. In St. Petersburg, the battalions bear the names “Kronstadt”, “Neva” and “Pavlovsk”, which are significant for the region.
In the Chuvash battalion "Atal" (translated as "Volga"), one of the requirements for candidates is knowledge of the Chuvash language.
The Tatarstan detachments "Alga" (in Tatar "forward") and "Timer" (translated as "iron") in the local media are called only national battalions.
In the conditionally “Russian” regions, there are also proposals to create ethnically homogeneous parts
Moreover, in the conditionally “Russian” regions, there are proposals to create ethnically homogeneous parts. For example, in the Perm Territory, in addition to the Parma and Molot battalions, where all local residents are taken, they are going to create a battalion of ethnic Uzbeks (!) called Amir Timur. The initiative was put forward by the organization "Society of Central Asian Uzbeks of the Perm Territory", but so far it has received support. Moreover, the government of Uzbekistan has promised to bring all its citizens who go to fight in Ukraine to criminal liability for mercenarism.
Separate regional battalions are initially created with specific specifics that are different from ordinary motorized rifle units. In the Kursk region, the battalion "Seim" (the name of the local river) is declared as an auxiliary part of the logistics. Tank battalions are being created in the Perm Territory (Molot) and the Nizhny Novgorod Region (Kuzma Minin Battalion). In the Ulyanovsk region, volunteers are being recruited for the Sviyaga engineer battalion and the Simbirsk howitzer-artillery battalion.
Some regions prefer not to contact volunteers. For example, the Arkhangelsk region took patronage over the active motorized rifle battalion of the 200th separate motorized rifle brigade of the 14th army corps of the Northern Fleet, staffed mainly by natives of the region. The battalionreceived the honorary name "Arkhangelsk".
Some regions prefer not to contact volunteers
And in some places, ethnic homogeneous units in the form of companies and platoons appear under the auspices of the BARS detachments. In particular, volunteers from Tuva fight in such detachments, and the head of the republic, Vladislav Khovalyg, willingly shares with the public the fantastic details of their military exploits. According to him , almost all Tuvans are presented for state awards, and in between combat missions they entertain their colleagues with Tuvan throat singing, recite poetry, play the guitar and button accordion.
A separate story with the Chechen volunteer battalion "Akhmat". Literally everyone is recruited there, including people with a criminal record, and sometimes Chechens who have been guilty of the head of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, are forcibly included in its composition. The fighting qualities of the soldiers of this unit are in question, in contrast to the outstanding talents in making videos for TikTok and torturing prisoners of war .
At the same time, the Akhmat battalion is built on the principles of ethnic segregation. In the first wave of attacks, there are usually non-Chechen fighters, and ethnic Chechens make up the second echelon.
At the same time, Kadyrov created four full-fledged national battalions not from volunteers, but from personnel officers of the Chechen security forces, with a total number of 1,800 people. In total, according to Kadyrov , 9,000 fighters have been trained in Chechnya to be sent to Ukraine, and another 10,000 people are in reserve.
In general, judging by open data, the recruitment of people to the Russian national battalions is proceeding with a creak. The regular strength of the battalion is from 400 to 600 people, but in a significant number of regions they initially set an underestimated bar of 200-300 people. Despite gigantic (by the standards of Russian regions) salaries at the level of 200 thousand rubles a month and lump-sum payments from local budgets of 200-300 thousand rubles, so far there are only Cossack formations, Tuvan, Ossetian and Chechen volunteers, as well as several mouth from other regions.
Recruitment of people in the Russian national battalions goes with a creak
There have already been examples in history when the formation of parts of the Armed Forces on the principle of ethnic homogeneity led to the disintegration of the state. So, for example, the Polish legions of the army of the Austro-Hungarian Empire after the collapse of the country in 1918 became the basis for the army created on its ruins of independent Poland. After the February Revolution of 1917, Russia experienced an extremely unsuccessful experience of Ukrainization of individual parts of the army and navy.
Obviously, even today, national battalions financed from local budgets, staffed by natives of one region and emphasizing their national or regional identity with a special set of symbols and values, are relatively easy to “switch” from participation in the war for the sake of “unity of Ukrainians and Russians” to the unfair position of their own ethnic group / subject in the highly centralized Russian Federation. And there are prerequisites for this, local anti-war movements are actively developing in the regions.
Anti-war ethnic movements
Vladimir Putin likes to mention not only the unity of the Russian and Ukrainian peoples, but also the unity of the peoples within Russia. However, not all representatives of ethno-national (and even some "Russian") subjects of the Russian Federation support the war unleashed by them and want to take part in it.
Buryatia
The first ethnic anti-war initiative in Russia was the Free Buryatia Foundation. The organization provides legal support to contract soldiers who do not want to fight, and denounces ethnic racism and xenophobia in Russia.
“Since 2015, we have been trailed by “Putin’s fighting Buryats,” which the Kremlin has designed, among other things,” says Alexandra Garmazhapova, head of the foundation. – And we realized that we need to express our position, that we do not agree with this war. We shot several anti-war videos, and each time there were more and more of us – and the foundation was formed. Relatives of Buryat contractors (and then not only Buryats) and contractors themselves began to write to us with a request to help break the contract. It was back in March. And we urgently had to look for lawyers. It was obvious that to turn around and say "guys, we just wanted to make one anti-war video, and then you'll do it yourself" would be pretty irresponsible. At first we thought that they were units, then that they were tens. As a result, in total, more than 500 people have turned to us for consultations.” Recently, we managed to return 150 contract soldiers who refused to fight back to Buryatia.”
Kalmykia
Soon after the outbreak of hostilities, an anti-war movement appeared in Kalmykia, whose participants also began by recording a video: they opposed the war, recalled the persecution of Kalmyks in the USSR and the oppression of ethnic minorities in modern Russia, and also called on their fellow countrymen not to participate in military operations on the territory of Ukraine .
“The Kremlin’s use of Russia’s national minorities is manipulation,” said Dorji Mandzhiev, deputy head of the Yabloko party in the Republic of Kalmykia and organizer of the Kalmyks Against War anti-war movement. – At the moment, at least 12 people from Kalmykia died in the war, but for the 300,000-strong population of Kalmykia, this is a big figure. To die for what? For the ambitions of the dictator and this regime? No Russian life is worth it. Our movement was created so that together we could influence the situation at least in our region, so that the Kalmyks would not go to this murderous war and genocide, so that they would understand that the Kremlin has brought us to the point that people are ready to give their lives and body parts for some small crumbs from the master's table. With an average salary of $200 a month, the commissariat invites and gives a lift of 300,000 rubles for the military. It's crazy, but people have been driven to such desperation that they are ready to lay down their lives and leave their families."
Mandzhiev is sure that the anti-war movement is only the starting point from which the further struggle for federalization will begin: “This war has become an impetus for the self-awareness of peoples. That is, the Kremlin uses us only when necessary. It turns out that when the war is “we are all brothers”, and in your free time “you are chumps” and “we rent an apartment only to the Slavs”. The Kremlin considers us just meat that can be used on the front lines. Ukrainians were also called brothers. But brothers don't do that. I think that in the future all this will develop into the self-consciousness of the national republics – we will demand real federalization from the Kremlin, not only on paper. If this issue is not resolved, it may end in a civil war.”
We will demand real federalization from the Kremlin, otherwise the matter may end in a civil war
Tyva
An anti-war movement also appeared in Tyva. Activists not only tell the truth about the war, but also help soldiers return home from Ukraine. In June, nine soldiers from the Tuva brigade, who were on a business trip in Kyrgyzstan and were preparing to be sent to Ukraine, with the help of members of the movement, were able to terminate their contracts ahead of schedule and return to Tyva.
“The need to find a community of anti-war Tuvan like-minded people arose with the outbreak of war for many of us. But finding such people was not a trivial task,” one of the activists of the New Tyva movement tells The Insider. — It all started with the fact that one of the future co-founders of our movement began to study the comments on the anti-war Instagram posts “Asians of Russia”. I found those who condemned the war and, if it was clear that it was someone from Tuva, I wrote to them in private messages. Thus, a tiny backbone of caring people who wanted to act was formed. Several events also led to the creation of the organization: the news about the deceased nephew of the co-founder, the statistics that appeared about a large number of Tuvans who died in the war, and the radio intercepts of Tuvan signalers, from which it became clear that they were used on the front lines because of a different language. In addition, the deputy from Tyva, Eres Kara-Sal, greatly helped the development of the organization. Thanks to his publicly expressed anti-war position and several interviews, more Tuvans began to subscribe to us. First of all, we are trying to convince our fellow countrymen not to support this war by helping to terminate the military contract, communicating directly with contractors and their families and, of course, informing them about the real state of affairs in the war. The participants in the movement are mainly from Tuva, but we help not only Tuvan contract soldiers, but in general everyone who applies. More than once it happened that some Tuvan soldiers turned to us for help to terminate the contract and return home, and with them, for example, several of their Russian colleagues. We refuse to help anyone."
Like fellow Kalmykians, Tuvans see the anti-war struggle as part of a movement for federalization: “We will continue to do our work until the war is over. But we hope that after it something more will be born from the movement. Something that will set Tuva on the path to democracy and help create the conditions for a true federalization of Russia.”
Yakutia
In Yakutia, those who disagree with the war created the Sakha vs War community. Here's what one of its organizers told The Insider:
“Participants of our movement have an extremely negative attitude towards all military aggressions from the Kremlin, both against sovereign states (Georgia, Syria, Ukraine), and within the regions of Russia, referring to the Chechen wars for the independence of Ichkeria. From the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, back in 2014, the activists of our movement openly spoke out against the annexation of Crimea. Unfortunately, after the adoption of the law on discrediting the Armed Forces, we had to go underground and create an Instagram page through which we actively convey our point of view. Talented and creative people live in our republic, thanks to whom tourism, IT, cinematography, art, science, and sports were actively developing before the war. We are an ambitious and bright people. War crosses out our future and puts a bloody cross on it.
The war revealed many festering sores on the body of the Russian state: this is racism, and the imposition of imperialist values of Moscow, and the lack of the right to self-determination among the small nationalities of Russia, and centralized management, which takes all the wealth of the regions to Moscow. Our task is to shake up the Yakut information field, drawing attention to these and other long overdue questions and problems. We want to stir up the swamp from many years of fear and silence. Our community has attracted the attention of many other anti-war movements and has now rallied around us all the opponents of the war from Yakutia and other regions.”
Signs of half-life
The economic crisis that followed the war is fueling separatist sentiment because the regions don't really understand why they should take the rap from Moscow's suicidal policies. В регионах уже столкнулись со спадом промышленного производства, ростом безработицы и сокращением поступлений в бюджеты. По безработице — самому взрывоопасному показателю — доступны довольно подробные оценки: сильнее всего пострадают регионы с крупными промышленными кластерами и экспортоориентированными предприятиями, такие как Курганская, Калужская, Самарская области, Республики Коми и Татарстан. А вот регионы со слабой недиверсифицированной экономикой и большой долей бюджетного сектора (Республики Северного Кавказа, Тыва) почти не почувствуют на себе спада на рынке труда.
В конечном итоге ни в одном из субъектов Российской Федерации пока не наблюдается сочетания всех трех тревожных с точки зрения сепаратизма признаков: создания местных батальонов добровольцев, сильного антивоенного движения с этнической или региональной компонентой и серьезных вызовов социально-экономической стабильности.
Но как минимум в десяти регионах в наличии два признака из трех. О том, как война и кризис могут сказаться на регионаз и единстве страны, The Insider поговорил с регионалистом Николаем Петровым.
Николай Петров, российский политолог и политический географ
Тыва, Бурятия, Калмыкия, Дагестан, Северная Осетия и Ингушетия — все эти национальные республики относятся, по типологии специалистки в области социально-экономического развития регионов Натальи Зубаревич, к Четвертой России. These are national republics, and their behavior does not fit into the general patterns that work in most other Russian regions. Они управлялись многие годы этническими элитами, но сейчас ситуация меняется или уже поменялась — как в Дагестане, где Москва заменяет местную корневую элиту на приезжую без особого эффекта. Но в реакции на санкции и кризис, то, как это ни странно, они могут себя чувствовать в динамике лучше, то есть меньше испытывать негативный эффект санкций, чем многие другие более развитые регионы, чем столицы и крупные индустриальные регионы, только потому, что они во многом дотационные. This is a purely public sector. Although it is clear that eventually the negative effect will sooner or later affect the financial and economic support that these republics receive from the federal center.
Subsidized regions in dynamics will feel better than industrial ones
For many years, my colleagues and I have compiled a rating of the socio-economic and political well-being of regions from 2015 to 2020 on a number of indicators – economic statistics, political dynamics, and protests. В социально-экономическом аспекте мы оценивали две категории рисков: краткосрочные, связанные с динамикой доходов населения, с доходами бюджета региона и с динамикой производства; и среднесрочные, связанные с динамикой торгового оборота, задолженностью бюджетов и динамикой инвестиций, то есть то, что может в ближней перспективе привести к растущей напряженности и то, что в средней перспективе к этому тоже может вести. При этом мы оценивали социально-экономическую ситуацию и с точки зрения домохозяйств (доходы и торговые обороты), и с точки зрения регионов и региональных бюджетов.
In the North Caucasus, the risks of the household economy have always been high, and at the same time, Dagestan has always been among the high-risk regions during all the years of measurement, because there political risks were combined with an active protest movement.
Если посмотреть на российские регионы с точки зрения уровня зарплат, скажем, в прошлом году, то мы увидим, что Калмыкия, Дагестан, Ингушетия и Северная Осетия находятся в самом низу этого рейтинга. При этом Калмыкия — самый бедный с точки зрения уровня зарплат регион. There, 20% of the population has salaries below 15 thousand rubles a month. Дальше идет Дагестан, который с примерно такими же показателями, как Ингушетия и Калмыкия. В Северной Осетии дела обстоят немного лучше, ещё лучше в Туве и Бурятии, но это зависит от того, на какие показатели мы смотрим: по абсолютной величине зарплат Тува и Бурятия выглядят гораздо более прилично, чем регионы Северного Кавказа. Но это регионы с северными надбавками, и там потребительская корзина гораздо дороже. Поэтому когда экономисты смотрят на соотношение доходов к стоимости корзины товаров и услуг, и на долю населения за чертой бедности, то Тува является абсолютным чемпионом, а Калмыкия и Ингушетия очень недалеко от неё ушли. At the same time, Tuva is the only region where the ratio of income to the cost of the basket is less than one, that is, the average level of income is not enough to provide a minimum set of goods and services. One third of the population lives below the poverty line. In North Ossetia and Dagestan, the situation is slightly better, but they are all below the Russian average.
В Тыве даже среднего уровня доходов не хватает, чтобы обеспечить минимальный набор товаров и услуг
Надо понимать, что когда мы говорим о российской экономической статистике, тем более по национальным республикам, цифры эти очень неточны — особенно это касается цифр по Северному Кавказу. То есть расслоение большое, уровень жизни в целом низкий, но не надо абсолютизировать те цифры, которые мы видим в исполнении Росстата. Можно сказать, что все эти регионы находятся в достаточно плачевном состоянии, но именно потому, что они и до кризиса, и до санкций не благоденствовали. For them, the blow of the crisis is now less noticeable and distinguishable than for regions such as Tatarstan, which were among the leaders, and today they are losing a lot due to sanctions and consequences.
All the regions we are talking about are regions subsidized by the federal center, and in this capacity they feel today almost the same as they did yesterday or the day before yesterday. Their losses will be associated with the deterioration of the socio-economic situation in the country as a whole, with budget cuts, primarily for subsidies to the regions and for assistance to regional budgets, although the North Caucasus has been and remains one of the very important priorities for the Kremlin.
При этом мы говорим о небольших регионах, и население в значительной степени сельское, не городское. Это значит, что некоторый уровень стабильности там есть благодаря тому, что люди в гораздо меньшей степени зависят от работы промышленных предприятий и денег, которые за эту работу могут получать граждане, а во многом от себя самих и своих участков. Хотя вот эти национальные регионы относятся к Четвертой России, типологически они примыкают к Третьей, которую составляет сельская глубинка, зависящая от пенсий. Они, в свою очередь, будут индексироваться и дальше, но нет зависимости ни от доходов промышленных предприятий, ни от эффективности их работы, ни от самого факта работы крупных промышленных предприятий.
It is Moscow that provokes conflicts leading to the split of the country
In each of these republics, even the smallest Ingushetia, there are different clans whose interests are somehow balanced. В Дагестане, например, представители крупных этносов контролируют основные сферы экономики, и как только баланс начнет меняться, это напрямую ударит по интересам этнических кланов, а через них по этническим группам. А в ситуации Дагестана, где этнические группы расселены компактно, это приобретает территориальное измерение и может вызвать социальный взрыв наподобие того, что мы видели в республике в прошлом. It will be very difficult to maintain a balance, and any friction and change in balance, any shift in the interests of different ethnic clans will be a destabilizing factor in one way or another.
Что касается ситуации с расколом Российской Федерации, это не разовое событие, а цепочка действий и их последствий. Главную проблему, я думаю, надо видеть не в том, что какие-то этнические кланы хотят отделиться. The problem is that in the conditions of over-centralization, it is Moscow that can provoke those conflicts that will ultimately lead to the prospect of a split in the country. Но не потому, что кто-то сегодня хочет и способен выдвигать лозунги отделения от России, а потому, что Кремль, пытаясь управлять централизованно сменяющейся ситуацией, распределять деньги и сохранять баланс интересов этнических групп или же игнорировать этот баланс, будет вести к дестабилизации. Дальше уже возникает цепочка — нарушаются интересы этнических кланов, это может привести к серьезным протестам по самым разным поводам, а если реакция на эти протесты недостаточно взвешенная и выверенная, то она может вести к усилению, а не ослаблению конфликта. К сожалению, Кремль не может реагировать быстро и точно, потому что из Москвы ситуация видна гораздо менее содержательно, чем изнутри региона. (Целиком колонку Николая Петрова о влиянии войны и санкций на перспективы распада России читайте здесь )
Материал подготовлен совместно с Софьей Пресняковой и при участии Бориса Соколова