Reflections on the mistakes of Western countries have become an important part of the global discussion about the causes of what happened on February 24 this year. Without removing Russia's responsibility for unleashing an aggressive war, many commentators point out that since the West could not prevent Russian aggression, then something in the strategy to contain Putin was wrong. Opinions fundamentally differ on what exactly – here opinions differ fundamentally: someone reproaches Western politicians for being too flexible and compliant, which allowed Putin to feel impunity, someone (although there are fewer of them), on the contrary, says that the West should not have ignored the anxieties and fears Putin about the expansion of NATO. One way or another, “containment” did not work out, and from the creeping expansion of 2014, Putin moved on to a full-scale aggressive war, which Europe has not remembered for 70 years. How can this failure be explained by the low level of expertise of experts on Russia or by the fact that Western politicians listen little to their experts? And who in general is studying Russia abroad today?
Expert groups
The Insider's interlocutors, who observe the work of the Western expert community, divide independent specialists on Russia (those who work outside government structures) into four main categories.
The first group consists of academic scientists who conduct teaching and research activities in specialized centers at universities. There are master's programs and entire departments dealing with Russian studies in many American and European universities. Among them are the Harriman Institute at Columbia University (formerly the Russian Institute), the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard, the Center for Eurasian, Russian and East European Studies at Georgetown University, the Russian Institute at King's College London.
The second category includes employees of think tanks who have received scientific degrees in Russia studies. Most of these structures are based in Washington: created in 1974 to study the USSR, the Kennan Institute at the Woodrow Wilson Center, the Atlantic Council, the Brookings Institution, the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and others. In Europe, for example, the British Chatham House, the German Institute for International Relations and Security (SWP), the French Institute for International Relations (IFRI) are considered influential. Many expert centers study Russia not as a separate region, but as part of large Eurasian programs that include not only the post-Soviet countries, but also the Balkans and Turkey.
The third group of experts who often comment on events in Russia are people from the public sector, former officials and diplomats who are familiar with the country and have contacts there. Its typical representative is John Herbst, former US ambassador to Uzbekistan and Ukraine, and now head of the Eurasian Center in the Atlantic Council. Going into expertise, such specialists monetize their experience in public and diplomatic service, notes Olga Khvostunova, researcher of the Eurasian program of the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI, Philadelphia): “At the same time, the more time has passed since their retirement, the less they understand in modern Russia. Not everyone has a real desire to understand the state of affairs.”
Finally, country studies are carried out by applied analysts at international non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House and Amnesty International, but their area of interest is usually limited to human rights issues (human rights, freedom of the media, the non-profit sector, etc.).
The careers of many professional Russianists develop between research and government structures: from an expert center they are called up for civil service, and after a while they can return to science (the so-called “revolving door” principle). A striking example is one of the leading Russian scholars, a specialist in Russian history and co-author of the book "Mr. Putin: an operative in the Kremlin" Fiona Hill.
Under the Obama administration, Fiona Hill was in charge of Russia at the National Intelligence Council, and under Trump moved from the Brookings Institution to the US National Security Council (NSC), becoming the White House's chief adviser on Moscow strategy. After retiring in the summer of 2019, Hill returned to Brookings. Similar migrations took place in the career of another authority figure, a key Russianist in the Obama administration, Celeste Wallander. She taught at several universities, headed the Russian-Eurasian program at CSIS, and in 2009 entered the civil service: she studied Russia and Ukraine at the Pentagon, and oversaw the Russian direction at the NSS. Today, Wallander is Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs.
Indirect influence
According to the observations of scientists and experts interviewed by The Insider, their real influence on foreign policy decisions is small. They can identify problems or suggest possible solutions, but they are not directly involved in the process, explains Michael Kimmage, a professor of history at the Catholic University of America, a specialist in the Cold War (during the Obama administration, he worked on the Russian and Ukrainian dossier in the Department of Political Planning at the State Department), so at best, independent expertise helps politicians "test the quality of the ideas" they initially hold:
“Think tanks are often used as platforms for validating already developed solutions: their employees comment on the current agenda for the media, which means they can explain to the general public what is happening in the field of international relations. The influence of academic scholars, many of whom are not in Washington, and even less so, are consulted ad hoc – for example, before writing a speech or an official visit. It is extremely rare for politicians to adopt ideas directly from ‘academics’.”
In the experience of Stephen Sestanovich, professor at Columbia University and senior fellow at the Center for Russian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, centers of expertise influence elite opinion much more than politicians. Director of the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, US Ambassador to Russia in 2012-2014 Michael McFaul says that the Joe Biden administration maintains regular contacts with independent experts:
“Personally, I have the impression that they [Biden's people – The Insider] interact with outside specialists more than the Obama administration did, and certainly more than the Trump administration. However, this does not mean that we influence them. Sometimes it works the other way around: they try to influence us, explain their policies so that we can better communicate their ideas by speaking publicly.”
The process is similar in Germany. Politicians at various levels regularly exchange views with professional researchers, confirms Fabian Burckhardt, a research fellow at the German Institute for Eastern and South-Eastern European Studies. Leibniz and editor of Russland-Analysen. At the same time, they have to deal with different groups of influence – with the governments of other countries, business, civil society, the media, with their party members and voters. In addition, many politicians already have a well-established position regarding Russia, and they defend it to the last.
“As a result, even if a constructive dialogue develops behind closed doors – with an honest exchange of opinions and criticism – in the “real world” authorities are often limited in their actions. Publicly, they may refer to expert opinions to legitimize their own views and decisions. In other words, we can talk about influence if the positions of experts and politicians coincide. Otherwise, it is extremely difficult to convince them. In general, experts are usually consulted when “the house is already on fire”, and much less often during relatively quiet periods when long-term strategic decisions must be made.”
According to Ben Noble, Associate Professor of Russian Politics at University College London, Chatham House Fellow, it is difficult to unequivocally determine how much the political establishment listens to the expert community – it depends on the area of policy, department and time period: “Among experts, there are indeed often complaints about insufficient attention of the authorities to their analysis. At the same time, I know cases when politicians made decisions based on expert opinions.”
Fundamentals of Russian Studies
During the Cold War, Sovietology was considered a prestigious area of scientific activity. In the United States, the Russian language and culture were actively studied, the training of Sovietologists was considered a national interest, and projects related to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries received generous funding. Many graduates of specialized university programs went to work in government structures. For example, former secretaries of state Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice have a Sovietological background.
Everything changed in 1991 with the collapse of the USSR. Russia was no longer perceived as the number one threat, and the need for systematic study of it seemed to have disappeared. The thaw in relations led to budget cuts, curtailment of educational and research programs, and job cuts for Russian specialists. Interest in Russia was fading, and those who continued to engage in it were treated more like marginals.
In 1991, Russia was no longer perceived as the number one threat, and the need for its systematic study seemed to have disappeared.
Under George W. Bush, the situation was aggravated by a new factor: the September 11 attacks reoriented American foreign policy towards the Middle East and the fight against terrorism for a long time, and the formation of the Putin regime turned out to be a “blind zone” for the expert community. The final chord sounded in 2013, when the State Department suspended funding for an in-depth study of the post-Soviet space. Established during the Reagan administration, over the course of 30 years this program has trained more than one generation of American Russian scholars.
As early as next year, it became clear how short-sighted this decision was. On the eve of the referendum in Crimea in March 2014, The New York Times wrote about the deplorable state of professional Russian studies.
“Among experts, there is a belief that the lack of personnel in this area, coupled with the ineffective policies of the White House, have led to the formation of a simplified and caricatured image of a former superpower that refuses to go to the dustbin of history … Now experts on Russia hope that the global crisis, which, according to some, is the result of American naivety and a primitive approach to Russia, can serve as a catalyst for educating a new generation of specialists.”
In eight years, however, the personnel problem has not been resolved, Michael McFaul complains in an interview with The Insider: “ <After February 24 — The Insider> we did not begin to invest more money in the study of Russia and the region, but we should have done it. People of my generation have a lot of experience in expertise, but the next one is worrying me.” He warns that a lack of new talent will see the US government's knowledge of Russia dwindle over time.
The Insider's interlocutors believe that the current crisis is likely to spur the growth of investment in Russian studies. The editorial director of the analytical project Riddle Russia (many foreign Russianists publish there) Anton Barbashin believes that there are all the prerequisites for this. “My colleague from Britain says that they now have more and more students choosing to study Russia and Eurasia in general, so in the future they will increase the number of teaching hours and teachers – there is clearly a demand for this.”
There is also a request from the authorities. The experience of Ben Noble from University College London testifies to the fact that in recent months high-quality expertise on Russia has become very much in demand: grew noticeably. I won’t be surprised if we soon see an increase in resources for research related to Russia and Ukraine.”
Things are different in Germany. According to Fabian Burckhardt, after the annexation of Crimea, new money flowed into the field of research in the post-Soviet space, and even new institutions were created. However, today the country's authorities are cautiously spending on science. The federal government has already announced major budget cuts to major foundations supporting academic collaboration and exchanges of researchers and students: “These savings appear to be related to the expected rise in energy prices and the economic downturn. So I would not expect an immediate new wave of interest in the study of Russia either from German politicians or from the scientific community. At the same time, it is quite clear that in the future this will be a strategic mistake.”
Discussions are now underway in scientific and expert circles on how to continue research activities in an environment where any institutional partnership and personal contacts with Russia should be stopped, continues Burkhardt. “In the foreseeable future, it will most likely become impossible to conduct high-quality field research in Russia. The inability to come to the country and collaborate with Russian colleagues will be an important factor that will determine the topics and methods of research. As a result, all this may lead to the fact that even fewer scientists will focus their research interest on Russia.”
“The systematic underestimation of Putin has cost too much”
Do financial and personnel problems affect the level of expertise in Russia? And do the mistakes of experts transform into mistakes of politicians? Almost all Russianists interviewed by The Insider are convinced that Western governments are provided with all possible information and claims against the expert community are unfair. According to them, experts on Russia were quite sober in assessing where the Putin regime was heading, so the problem is not a lack of expert knowledge, but its transfer to politicians and society.
The level of competence of American Russianists today is very high, which cannot be said about the quality of Russian expertise in the United States, Michael McFaul believes.
“In my opinion, the lack of understanding of the Putin system is shown by those who know nothing about Russia, but consider themselves specialists in international relations in general – a classic example here is [University of Chicago professor John] Mearsheimer. These theorists are indeed very wrong about Russia, but at the same time they have a lot of influence in American foreign policy circles.”
Arguing about why only a few in the expert community did not doubt the possibility of a full-scale war in Ukraine, The Insider's interlocutors draw parallels with the collapse of the USSR. Few people in the West foresaw what Gorbachev would do, and those who predicted the end of the empire believed that it would happen for other reasons. However, such miscalculations cannot be called a failure of expertise – rather, it indicates how difficult it is to apply knowledge in the "chaos of rapidly developing events," says Stephen Sestanovich of the Council on Foreign Relations: "For almost all Russians I know – even those who who is close to the Kremlin – what happened [February 24] was a complete surprise. It is strange to believe that Western experts understand the processes taking place in Russia better than the Russian elites, especially when the country's president does something exceptionally stupid.
However, there are also serious grounds for criticism. Michael Kimmage of the American Catholic University notes two major gaps in the understanding of Putin's Russia abroad. First, they tend to regard Putin's foreign policy as "reactive", believing that Russia is only reacting to Western impulses. However, in recent years, Russian foreign policy has been very active, starting with Georgia and ending with the current aggression against Ukraine. Secondly, the Western expert community constantly underestimates both Putin himself and the level of popular support for his course, Kimmage believes:
“The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 was not expected by either experts or politicians. The annexation of Crimea came as an absolute shock to the Western system. The war with Ukraine in 2014-2015 was less shocking but just as unexpected. Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election was also not predicted by any of the experts. With the February invasion of Ukraine, everything is different. The intelligence services gave a very accurate assessment of the actions of the Kremlin, and in expert circles there were warnings back in November 2021 that this could happen. However, most experts still believed that Putin would not dare to attack, that it was all a bluff and a step too radical for him. Эта систематическая недооценка Путина обошлась слишком дорого. Логично предположить, что некоторые из стандартных представлений о России ошибочны и требуют пересмотра».
Майкл Макфол соглашается, что ошибки были, но ответственность за них возлагает на политиков — США слишком долго и усердно старались ничем не провоцировать Путина:
«После вторжения в Грузию Буш не предпринял почти ничего — не было ни санкций, ни военной помощи. После аннексии Крыма Запад наложил санкции, но военную помощь Украине не оказал. Нам стоило более агрессивно вести себя в отношении этого режима. Отправь мы HIMARS и дальнобойную артиллерию в Украину еще несколько лет назад, возможно, Путин не решился бы на вторжение. Кроме того, гигантской ошибкой было то, что США делали очень мало для укрепления демократии и рыночной экономики в России в 1990-е годы. Если бы мы тогда оказали более серьезную помощь и Россия бы быстрее оправилась экономически, Путин, может быть, вообще не пришел бы к власти».
«Отправь мы HIMARS и дальнобойную артиллерию в Украину еще несколько лет назад, возможно, Путин не решился бы на вторжение»
Нежелание провоцировать Путина укладывается в концепцию realpolitik, которая раньше доминировала в американской политике, продолжает Ольга Хвостунова из Института исследований внешней политики. Реалисты настаивают, что с российским режимом нужно продолжать диалог несмотря ни на что: если США могут поддерживать отношения с Саудовской Аравией, то почему их нельзя поддерживать с Россией? К тому же у каждого американского президента до сегодняшнего дня были амбиции выстроить эффективную систему отношений с Москвой, заключить с ней «большую сделку», добавляет эксперт.
Одним из главных стратегических просчетов Вашингтона Ольга Хвостунова считает приверженность известной теории, согласно которой две страны, в которых есть McDonald's, никогда не станут воевать друг с другом.
«Американские политики были уверены, что если Запад поможет России выйти на глобальный рынок, она смягчится и одумается. Возможно, эта уверенность была основана на том, что так это работает с другими странами. Многими исследованиями доказано, что торговые отношения действительно снижают остроту конфликта, но у каждого правила есть исключение. Вот Россия — такое исключение».
До февраля 2022 года в западных экспертных кругах активно обсуждалось, каким должен быть подход к отношениям с Москвой, рассказывает Майкл Киммидж. Одни считали, что поддерживать с ней связи бессмысленно и конфронтация — единственно возможный вариант. Другие выступали за баланс между взаимодействием и противостоянием. С началом войны расклад изменился — и сегодня в экспертной среде в целом сложился консенсус по поводу правильности проводимой Западом политики (санкций и военной помощи Украине).
«Этот консенсус предполагает, что с Путиным нельзя вести переговоры, что его планы в отношении Украины совершенно нелегитимны, что он должен потерпеть поражение в этой войне — и если это произойдет, политическая динамика в России, может быть, начнет меняться и станут возможны изменения в руководстве страны. Однако не исключено, что мы снова недооцениваем политическую жизнестойкость Путина».