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What missiles are being fired at Ukraine
The attack on Ukraine on the night of February 24, 2022 began with a massive strike by short-range cruise and ballistic missiles. Over 160 missiles hit mainly military targets. At the same time, 137 civilians were killed , 316 were injured. During the first days of the campaign, the Russian command hoped to stun the political leadership of the enemy, disrupt the command and control of the troops and, ultimately, deprive the disorganized units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine of the will to resist as part of the “storm and onslaught” strategy, a lightning-fast military special operation (“Kyiv in three days "). But the blitzkrieg failed, and at the same time, the intensity of the use of long-range weapons also decreased. If in the first 11 days of fighting Russian troops fired about 600 missiles (55 per day), and in the first 26 days (March 21) – more than 1100 (42 per day), then by the 40th day (April 4), according to American estimates , the total number of missiles fired was more than 1400 , that is, the average number dropped to 35 per day. On May 10 (the 76th day of the war), President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelensky spoke about 2,154 Russian missiles (28 per day), and on June 23 (the 120th day of the war) – about 2,709 missiles (23 per day). By mid-summer (July 21), according to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine, Russia used 3,650 missiles, of which 1,486 were cruise missiles and 1,403 were air-to-surface missiles. To date, the average number of missiles has dropped to 20 per day and continues to decrease.
Already in the spring, information began to appear about the rapid depletion of the number of missiles (up to half of the pre-war stocks) and their low efficiency (failures at the level of 20% to 60% of the total number of launches. At the same time, the shelling was episodic with significant interruptions. About problems with the number Long-range weapons were also evidenced by a change in the range of missiles used: if at the beginning of the campaign the Caliber and Iskanders were mainly used, then gradually the Russian troops switched to strikes at ground targets with expensive Onyx and Kh-22 anti-ship missiles and even anti-aircraft guided missiles to the S-300 complexes.
Russian troops managed to organize rocket raids comparable in mass to the spring ones only in October-November. On October 10, 84 cruise missiles and 24 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) attacked Ukraine. The very next day, the number of missiles was reduced to 28, and UAVs to 15. On October 31, Russia fired 55 Kh-101 cruise missiles, one Kh-59 guided air missile, 22 S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, four Shahed-136 UAVs (they "Geran-2" – probably a localized version or a disguised alteration of loitering ammunition purchased in Iran) and "Lancet-3". And on November 15, more than 90 missiles were fired in Ukraine: about 70 Kh-101 / Kh-555 cruise missiles, about 20 Kalibr marines, as well as 10 Shahed-136/131 kamikaze drones
The latest available data suggests that as of October 24, 4,500 missiles were used against Ukraine (an average of less than 20 missiles per day), and thus Russia has almost exhausted its resources for ground-based guided missiles. According to the estimates of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, today Russia has only 13% of the pre-war stocks of missiles for the Iskander OTRK, although it still has about 43% of sea-based missiles of the Caliber type and 45% of Kh-101 and Kh- 555.
In the latest waves of Russian attacks, the means of fire destruction are represented almost exclusively by air-launched missiles (Kh-59, Kh-22 and Kh-101) and kamikaze drones of the type "Geranium-2". In total, the Russian side used more than 400 Geraniums. In fact, these are not even kamikaze drones, but “projectiles”, substitutes for scarce cruise missiles, and much cheaper (the estimated cost does not exceed $ 20-30 thousand apiece) than the missiles themselves (here the bill goes to millions of dollars). a piece).
Although the Geraniums look more like German V-family rockets from the 1940s (yes, the very wunderwaffe that Hitler hoped for so much), and not like modern loitering ammunition, thanks to a technically primitive design and target designation by coordinates they penetrate deep into the rear, often avoiding timely detection by air defense systems. True, the Iranian creators of the Geraniums developed them more for asymmetric wars waged, for example, by Yemeni or Palestinian rebels, and not for a large-scale conventional clash of two regular armies. Therefore, the effectiveness of "aircraft projectiles" remains in question: they are used against stationary targets and rather distract air defense than cause serious damage due to a modest warhead (50 kg).
In addition to reducing the intensity and changing the range of weapons available, the Russian command during the autumn campaign demonstrated a shift in the focus of long-range strikes to the energy infrastructure.
According to the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine (as of October 24), Russia carried out 85 strikes on energy facilities throughout the war, 51 of which occurred in October. The Ministry of Energy counted 300 strikes (by missiles, UAVs and artillery) on the energy system during the period from October 10 to 20. As a result of the raid on October 31, missiles and drones hit 18 objects in 10 regions of Ukraine, most of them related to the energy sector. On November 15, “arrivals” occurred at 15 energy facilities, followed by emergency power outages in the largest cities of Ukraine and even abroad (in Moldova)
The Russian command during the autumn campaign shifted the focus of long-range strikes to the energy infrastructure of Ukraine
Ukrainian officials refer to such attacks as “energy genocide.” According to President Zelensky , about 40% of Ukraine's energy infrastructure was damaged by early November. Power outages affected 4.5 million people. The Russian authorities make no secret of the fact that the purpose of the strikes is to leave Ukraine without electricity and thereby organize a humanitarian catastrophe in the country.
It seems that in the run-up to winter, strikes on critical infrastructure, not only energy, but utilities and waterworks, are becoming the Kremlin's main military tool. After all, despite partial mobilization, Russian troops directly on the front line continue to retreat.
How Ukrainian air defense showed itself
The Ukrainian air defense system before the war had only medium-range Soviet S-300s (several hundred launchers of early modifications), Buk-M1 self-propelled air defense systems (about 70 units) and an unknown (but definitely small) number of Tor-M1 combat-ready systems , "Cube", "Osa", "Strela-10", S-125 and (presumably) S-200. Morally and physically obsolete Soviet-made air defense systems, however, were included in the layered circuit, that is, they worked as a single system with radar and command posts.
The air defense work proved to be extremely (and unexpectedly) successful. With the exception of the first months of the war, the Russian Aerospace Forces are almost not used in the operational depth of defense due to high losses (primarily due to the saturation of the Ukrainian troops with portable air defense systems).
In total, the Russian Aerospace Forces reliably lost 63 combat aircraft and 57 helicopters, so ground attack (Su-25 aircraft) and army (Ka-52 helicopters) aircraft are only occasionally present on the line of contact. Su-24M and Su-34 bombers also avoid entering the affected area with air defense systems.
According to General Sergei Surovikin, commander of the so-called Special Military Operation (SVO), and at the same time the Aerospace Forces, during the 8 months of the war, Russian manned aviation (operational-tactical, army and long-range) made more than 34 thousand sorties, unmanned – more than 8 thousand sorties . During the day, only about 30 sorties are obtained for unmanned aircraft and 140 for manned aircraft. This is very little. For comparison, during Operation Desert Storm 30 years ago, the international coalition made 110,000 sorties, of which about half were combat sorties, in just 42 days more than 1,300 sorties per day.
Thus, the Ukrainian air defense as a whole coped with the task of preventing enemy aircraft from gaining air supremacy. A completely different conversation about anti-missile defense – missile defense. During the raid on October 10, the Ukrainians managed to shoot down 56 air targets (43 cruise missiles and 13 UAVs) out of 108 (84 cruise missiles and 24 UAVs) – a little more than 50%. In mid-October, the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine estimated the effectiveness of missile defense at 64% (81 missiles destroyed out of 126 used in a week). Of the 55 missiles fired by the Russian armed forces on October 31, 44-80% were shot down.
Ukrainian air defense successfully coped with the task of preventing enemy aircraft from dominating the air
The effectiveness of Ukraine's missile defense depends on two variables: 1) the massiveness of a simultaneous volley and its distribution by type of carriers (sea, air and land systems) and geography (the territory of Russia, Belarus, the waters of the Black and Caspian seas); 2) the type of weapons used.
With the first variable, everything is more or less clear: the more missiles are launched from different directions, the more difficult it is to intercept them. The second variable is directly related to the technical capabilities of available air defense systems. According to the official representative of the command of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Yuriy Ignat, Ukrainians generally cope with the Caliber, Kh-101, Kh-555 cruise missiles, Kh-59 guided aircraft missiles. Air-launched Kh-22, Kh-31 missiles, Onyx anti-ship missiles and missiles for Iskander operational-tactical systems are very difficult to resist, not to mention the hypersonic Kinzhals. In general, missiles that fly at speeds of more than 3,000 km/h pose an almost insurmountable task for Ukrainian air defense.
Ukrainians have nothing to oppose to supersonic and ballistic missiles
The representative of the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine, Vadim Skibitsky, said in a commentary for The Economist that out of 25 ballistic missiles launched in October against the Iskander complexes, only three were intercepted.
Finally, a completely separate conversation about loitering ammunition, they are also "aircraft-shells" of the "Geran-2" type. Despite the impressive footage of Geraniums hitting various targets in Ukrainian cities, captured on many videos, their effectiveness, as mentioned above, is at least not obvious. Loitering ammunition of this class has practically no effect on the course of hostilities, since they are used against stationary targets deep in the rear. So far, they take advantage of the number and use the vulnerabilities of tactical and objective air defense, which is not designed for confrontation with small and medium-sized drones.
But even now, the Ukrainians are shooting down 75% of the Geraniums (300 out of more than 400 launched). The challenges associated with them, rather, relate to the additional burden on the air defense system, forced to spend valuable anti-aircraft missiles. Between September 13 and October 17, Russia deployed 208 Geraniums worth between $12 million and $18 million, and Ukraine spent $28 million to shoot down 80% of them.
Allies help Ukraine, but not enough
According to estimates based on visually confirmed open sources, during the war, the Armed Forces of Ukraine lost more than 60 air defense units, including three dozen S-300 launchers, and over 30 units of radar stations and radars. The real losses, apparently, are much higher, and can reach 30–40% of the pre-war composition of forces and assets. At the same time, one can hardly consider Volodymyr Zelensky’s assessment adequate, according to which Ukrainian air defense has only 10% of what is needed.
Be that as it may, air defense systems occupy a modest place in the total volume of Western military aid deliveries. At first, the Allies focused on short-range man-portable air defense systems and tried to negotiate the transfer to Kyiv of Soviet-made air defense systems operated by NATO member states: Slovakia, Bulgaria and Greece.
In the total volume of Western military assistance to Ukraine, air defense systems occupy a modest place.
Until the autumn series of Russian strikes with missiles and loitering ammunition, Ukraine received very little: a S-300PMU division and 40 missiles for it from Slovakia, several dozen Gepard and Stormer self-propelled anti-aircraft guns from Germany and Great Britain, as well as obsolete Soviet systems like Strela complexes -10" or "Wasp" from the Czech Republic and the USA. However, the day after the October 10 attack, Mark Milley, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, promised to help Ukraine rebuild and improve its air defenses.
In October, Ukraine received the first complex (out of four promised) of the latest German medium-range air defense system IRIS-T SLM (hitting targets at an altitude of up to 20 km and at a distance of up to 40 km). The complex was transferred together with the TRML-4D advanced mobile multifunctional radar, capable of automatically tracking up to 1500 targets at a distance of up to 250 km.
IRIS-T was deployed in the Kiev region (judging by the fragments of the upper stage of the rocket to the complex found in one of the Kiev courtyards). According to the Ukrainian authorities, in combat conditions, the air defense system managed to neutralize 9 missiles out of 10.
In early November, two batteries (out of eight promised) of a modern medium-range anti-aircraft missile system jointly produced by the US-Norwegian NASAMS (National Advanced Surface-to-Air Missile System) arrived in the country. It is also important that the standard rocket of the NASAMS AIM-120 AMRAAM complex is the most common anti-aircraft missile in NATO (more than 16 thousand units of various modifications have been produced). And the entire air defense system is capable of firing four different types of missiles.
Western allies have committed themselves to supply several more types of air defense systems (Hawk, Crotale, Avenger). At the same time, Ukraine did not receive some of the systems that Kyiv persistently asked for and is unlikely to receive in the future.
Part of the air defense systems that Kyiv insistently requested, Ukraine did not receive and is unlikely to receive in the future
At the beginning of the war, there was a lot of talk about the need to transfer the Israeli "Iron Dome" to Ukraine. President Zelensky personally asked Israeli parliamentarians for means of protection against Russian rocket attacks. However, the supply of any Israeli weapons is burdened with political restrictions and is not yet possible for "operational reasons." In addition, the Iron Dome cannot withstand the ballistic and supersonic missiles that are in the Russian arsenal, and the complex itself is designed for a much smaller country than Ukraine, and for a completely different configuration and density of radar coverage.
Another type of air defense that Ukrainian officials and foreign experts constantly talk about is the American Patriot systems, capable of destroying aerodynamic and ballistic targets at a distance of 160 km and 50 km, respectively. The problem is that the Patriots are an expensive, technologically complex, capricious system in terms of operation and maintenance. One Patriot battery costs approximately $1 billion and requires 70 skilled personnel.
Instead of the American "Patriots", Ukraine intends to receive their European counterpart – the medium SAMP-T air defense systems. Italy has announced its readiness to transfer them in a new military aid package, but there is no information yet on the number of systems or on the timing of delivery.
What else can be done to protect the sky
At every stage of the war, Ukraine's Western allies found relatively quick and effective solutions to counter the Russian forces. In the first months, these were man-portable missile systems against tanks and aircraft operating at low altitudes. In the summer, when the Armed Forces of Ukraine needed a response to the tactics of overconcentrating artillery, they were supplied with a variety of long-range artillery systems that negated Russia's advantage with precision strikes against ammunition depots and command posts. Now, the main plot of the campaign, approaching the winter operational pause, is the battle for the security of the Ukrainian skies. So far, the air defense of Ukraine has been relatively successful in coping with Russian aircraft and loitering ammunition, but is unable to withstand mass missile launches, as well as ballistic and supersonic missiles. Deliveries of modern Western complexes are unlikely to change this situation.
The main plot of the military campaign in Ukraine, approaching the winter operational pause, is the battle for the safety of the sky
Firstly, medium-range systems are transferred in single copies, since air defense systems, as a rule, cannot be supplied from the presence, that is, removed from some air defense sectors (and thereby increase their vulnerability). They need to be ordered, produced, trained in calculations, delivered, deployed – and all this in combat conditions. Secondly, the allies will have to ensure the integration of air defense systems that are completely different in terms of technical, tactical and operational characteristics into a single system , and “over” the layered contour of the Soviet era.
There are no other options to help Ukraine: the introduction of a no-fly zone by NATO forces is impossible due to the risks of escalation and internationalization of the conflict, and it will not be possible to shoot down Russian missiles in the Ukrainian sky with air defense systems deployed in the alliance member countries for technical reasons.
On the other hand, during the entire period of the military campaign, the Russian side failed to maintain the intensity of strikes for at least several weeks, not to mention months. Stockpiles of missiles are likely to be running out . Obviously, there are somepolitical restrictions .
It is unlikely that the alignment will change the use of Iranian "aircraft-shells" "Geran-2". History shows that terrorist attempts to shift the costs of war onto the civilian population do not bring actual military dividends. But the Iranian ballistic missiles Fateh-110 and Zolfaghar, which Moscow is allegedly going to buy, can seriously worsen the situation in Ukraine. There is no effective defense against them .
In any case, the Kremlin will long retain the ability to periodically carry out massive raids with salvos of 50-100 long-range missiles of various types and "projectiles" after weeks and months of relative calm, necessary in order to accumulate a stockpile of weapons.
“Ukraine can be fully protected only through the closed skies protocol”
Igor Pavlenko, former officer of the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
Practice shows that the Ukrainian air defense quite effectively shoots down missiles that fall into the zone of influence of weapons of both ground and air segments of the air defense system. In the modes of missile-drone “zerg rushes”, the efficiency of the system oversaturated with targets, of course, drops. Also, in the current reality, Ukraine is forced to spend expensive missiles on drones. And this is a problem of both economic and logistical nature.
It is more efficient and cost-effective to destroy drones with anti-aircraft artillery. To do this, you just need to increase the concentration of fire weapons – Gepard-type systems, or upgrade Shilka-type systems accordingly. Special attention is also paid to electronic warfare systems, which quite successfully land Russian-made UAVs.
The deliveries of Gepard and Stormer ZSUs, IRIS-T and NASAMS air defense systems agreed and implemented by Western allies are not adequate to the scale of challenges facing Ukraine. The range of IRIS-T SLM missiles is 40 km. The battery control station can be located up to 20 km from the launchers. The high sensitivity radar is designed to detect low-flying cruise missiles such as the Kalibr. The IRIS-T SLM battery is capable of targeting all missiles at the same time, which distinguishes it from Soviet-made systems such as the Buk and S-300.
Depending on the ammunition used, the NASAMS complex can hit air targets at a distance of 20 to 180 km. British Stormers have a combat range of 3-8 km, although the Starstreak missile itself is quite fast, develops up to Mach 7 and has established itself as an excellent tool against fighters and cruise missiles.
The supply of the above-mentioned modern anti-aircraft systems makes it possible to build an echeloned air defense line on a rather limited section of the front (about 100–120 km) with a length of the contact line of about 1,500 km. Thus, we reach about 10% of what is needed.
Deliveries of Western anti-aircraft systems are not adequate to the scale of challenges facing Ukraine
Complexes of Soviet and post-Soviet production, such as the S-300PMU transferred by Slovakia, will quickly, but for a short time, cover up some gaps in the country's air defense system in terms of countering both ballistic missiles and enemy aircraft, since Ukraine has a significant number of specialists who can operate these types of weapons "from the wheels." The last S-300PMU complex was produced in 1994, and the manufacturer declared a warranty period of 25 years. But as a tool for "putting out a fire" in the "here and now" mode, the S-300 is quite a tool.
NATO certainly cannot protect Ukraine from Russian missiles on its own. Is that only the protocol of the closed skies and air patrols by planes of NATO countries in the airspace of Ukraine. Strategic missile defense systems can theoretically hit targets over Ukraine, but this is not a way out in countering Caliber and Russian front-line aviation.
“Ukraine has about 30% of what is needed”
Leonid Dmitriev, Ukrainian military expert
If we compare the pre-war and current state of Ukrainian air defense and missile defense, then it could be called degraded and focal until February 24. Now this system is built like a layered one, although, if we take the real need for air defense systems, then Ukraine is subjectively provided with a maximum of 30%. The air defense and missile defense system is not only a means of fire destruction, which really line up in several echelons of short, medium and long range. If until February 24 it was several divisions of S-300 and several divisions of something like "Buks", and complexes like "Shilka" and "Osa", now the arsenal is quite wide both in terms of producing countries and in terms of tactical and technical characteristics and nomenclature of ammunition.
What Ukraine currently has, not to mention the IRIS-T and NASAMS systems, are mostly short-range and medium-range systems that rely on electronic intelligence, direction finding and radar.
If we are talking about single targets or an attack with 10–15 missiles, then the repulsion coefficient for such attacks is about 80–90%. In general, defeating even 50% of air targets is quite a worthy result according to any standards, whether they are single complex targets or massive ones.
Ukraine has about 30% of what is needed in order to reliably cover its borders
Ukraine has about 30% of what is needed to reliably cover its borders and hit not 70-80% of air targets, but comfortably defend against what happened on October 10, as well as cover critical facilities. And we are talking not only about air defense, but also about electronic warfare, jammers and radars. The supply of HARM-type missiles is also important, which perfectly hit any electronic emitters and deprive the S-300 systems of the ability to direct their missiles anywhere.
From the point of view of logistics, administration and application, it would be easier to use one unified complex or a network of complexes of different ranges for defense separation. This would simplify the logistical tasks in terms of storing and delivering ammunition, and in terms of training personnel. But now Ukraine is waging a war for survival, and therefore the question is not worth it.
As for the integration of the delivered (and promised) Western-made air defense systems with the Soviet air defense / missile defense infrastructure already existing in Ukraine, we are talking not only about integration in terms of the range of ammunition that solve economic and logistical problems, but also about integrating the system of targeting, target setting and target designation, and radar. It is quite possible, and in the near future. The practice of the war in Ukraine has shown that combat control systems can be integrated even into the old Grads and D-30 howitzers. If you put the right software, then everything works extremely efficiently and looks, literally, like a computer game.
There are currently no ideal options that would make it possible to provide anti-missile (and anti-drone) defense of Ukrainian cities in the shortest possible time. A no-fly zone at the beginning of the war would solve a lot of defense issues, save tens of thousands of civilian lives, but now we need to think about creating something like the Israeli Iron Dome, that is, a layered and integrated missile defense system.
It might be worth considering laser technology, because systems like the Patriot or the Iron Dome shoot down multiple rocket launchers and even cannon fired projectiles, but from an economic standpoint, it's like stoking a stove with hundred dollar bills. because rockets are expensive.
Israel itself already has the technology of combat lasers, which can destroy cannon artillery shells on the fly not for several hundred thousand dollars per shot, but for several tens of kilowatts of electricity, with which Ukraine has no problems. Therefore, the question is to create a dense ring of means of fire destruction of air targets.
“A full-fledged missile defense system is possible only if NATO systems are deployed in Ukraine”
Ivan Karpov, independent military expert
In Ukraine, before the war, there was an outdated, but rather layered, air defense system, built according to Soviet patterns. The main problem is materiel. Now this problem has worsened, because losses have been added to the obsolescence of equipment and weapons. It is already very difficult to talk about layered air defense, there is a front line, there are separate objects, but in general, missile strikes and drone strikes are carried out against a variety of objects in cities.
Good intelligence partly compensates for the lack of defense in depth. But if there are no air defense systems in a particular area, then even knowing that something is flying, nothing can be done. This is not a panacea, but, of course, intelligence is the main advantage and the main Western assistance to Ukraine. First of all, we are talking about technical intelligence, because undercover intelligence will not help here. The ability to combine radars and broadcasts provides an information advantage, which increases efficiency and can partially close the air defense gap.
Intelligence is the main advantage and the main Western assistance to Ukraine
Air defense works more effectively when it protects the object covered by it. If the object is a plant, then our goal is for it to continue to function and work. Here, 20 enemy missiles fly at him, 18 of them were shot down, two flew in – one to the control center and the second to the generator. And that's all, two of the most important facilities at the plant are disabled, the plant cannot be controlled, and it has no power supply. Did the air defense work well? On the one hand, many missiles were shot down, and on the other hand, important targets were hit, and the plant is not working. It is impossible to estimate the effectiveness of air defense by the number of missiles.
The nomenclature of Ukrainian air defense is for the most part Soviet. In fact, the most massive thing that the West transmitted was portable anti-aircraft missile systems, that is, the Stinger and the Polish Peruns. So far, NATO assistance is insufficient. It is necessary to divide the front-line air defense and air defense of the country. If we talk about the military, then everything is not bad there, for example, there are Stingers that do not allow Russian aviation to work. Sometimes they fly in air defense coverage areas, but this is a risk that few people are willing to take.
As far as the country's air defense is concerned, so far Western assistance can be assessed as close to zero. The most effective part of it is the transfer of some Soviet-made systems, for example, when Slovakia transferred the S-300. The S-300 complex is a powerful thing, the basis of air defense, and their presence makes the planes cling to the ground. It's the same with the Buk, which work at medium ranges, compacting the defense. In addition, Buks are more mobile than S-300s. In part, Buks can replace Western supplies, but only in part. The West does not have such a mobile and self-sufficient system, which combines a self-propelled combat installation and a radar in one body, while allowing it to work with an external radar.
NASAMS complexes are a disconnected system, where the radar and the launcher are separate, and it has less mobility and more fold and deploy time, which is critical when the enemy also has electronic intelligence against you. The direct replacement for the S-300 is the American Patriot, but so far there is no talk of their transfer.
In order to ensure the anti-drone defense of Ukrainian cities as soon as possible, it is necessary to bring Western air defense units with their standard equipment into the country, that is, the direct participation of NATO air defense systems in the conflict.
The same applies to missile defense. NATO ground-based missile defense systems like Aegis would help Ukraine, but only if they are deployed on the territory of the country – simply because of the geography (elevation differences) and the characteristics of the targets. Given the detection capabilities and the peculiarities of Ukrainian geography, the possibilities of Aegis deployed near Ukraine will be limited to the western slopes of the Carpathians.
The material was prepared jointly with Sofia Presnyakova
