Russia planned to invade Ukraine in 10 days, occupy it and complete the annexation of territories by August, but this plan involved the use of deception and, as a result, Russian forces were unprepared at the tactical level to effectively carry it out. This is stated in the report of the British Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), which was prepared by military experts Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, former head of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine Oleksandr Danilyuk and ex-commander of the Airborne Assault Forces of Ukraine Mikhail Zabrodsky.
The authors of the report analyzed the main lessons learned from the hostilities between February and July 2022, based on operational data collected by the General Staff of Ukraine. They argue that the level of secrecy of the Russian plan was so high that even the military leadership at the level of deputy chiefs of the General Staff department found out about it a few days before the start of the war.
However, the report notes that this deception plan largely succeeded, with the Russians gaining a 12:1 advantage north of Kyiv.
The biggest shortcoming of the plan, according to the authors of the report, was the lack of reverse action. As a result, when speed did not produce the desired results, Russian forces found their positions steadily weakened as Ukraine mobilized.
Despite these setbacks, Russia refocused on the Donbass and, since Ukraine had by then largely used up its ammunition stocks, succeeded in subsequent operations slowed down by the determination rather than the capabilities of the Ukrainian forces.
The report notes that the tactical competence of the Russian military fell far short of the expectations of many Ukrainian, Russian and international observers. Russian weapon systems have proved to be largely effective, and the most experienced units have demonstrated that the Russian Air Force has significant military potential, even if shortcomings in training and the context of their application have prevented them from realizing this potential.
The report's authors identify five key areas worth looking at in judging whether the Russian military is making progress in addressing its structural and cultural weaknesses. These points should be used to assess Russia's future combat power, the report says.
- At present, the RF Armed Forces operate according to a hierarchy of formations, in which the priorities of the land component are of paramount importance, and the military as a whole is subordinate to the special services. This creates suboptimal employment for other industries.
- The model of formation of the RF Armed Forces is erroneous. It proposes the creation of joint combined arms formations in wartime, but does not have the power of junior leadership to rally these units.
- There is a culture of reinforcing failure if orders are not changed at higher levels. In the Russian Aerospace Forces, this is manifested to a lesser extent than in the Ground Forces and the Navy.
- The RF Armed Forces are vulnerable to deception because they lack the ability to quickly aggregate information, are reluctant to provide information to those who follow orders, and encourage a dishonest accountability culture.
- The RF Armed Forces have shown vulnerability in terms of "friendly fire" incidents. Electronic warfare systems and other means rarely eliminate this problem, and the methods of distinguishing between “us” and “them” and combat command and control of troops turned out to be inadequate. As a result, combat capabilities designed to empower each other can only be applied sequentially [and not simultaneously – The Insider].
The authors of the report intend to expand this study over time to cover the later phase of the war, when Ukraine moved to offensive operations. However, as the Armed Forces expend a significant amount of munitions and are now dependent on their international partners for equipment, it is important that these partners learn the appropriate lessons from the war, not only so that they can prepare to contain future threats and best support Ukraine. . A Ukrainian victory is possible, but it requires serious hard fighting, the researchers conclude, and with the right support, Ukraine can win.
