In Nagorno-Karabakh (Artsakh) on March 1, a meeting was held between representatives of the unrecognized republic and Azerbaijan, later the parties made conflicting statements about what topics were discussed during the negotiations. Since mid-December, the republic, which has a population of 120,000, has been under blockade, being cut off from Armenia and deprived of supplies of food, medicine and other essential goods.
In November, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev expressed dissatisfaction with the appointment of businessman Ruben Vardanyan to the post of State Minister of Artsakh, who moved to the unrecognized republic, renouncing Russian citizenship. He stated that he was ready to negotiate "with the Armenians living in Karabakh, but not with people like Vardanyan sent by Moscow," who, according to Aliyev, "was sent from Moscow with a very clear agenda." Subsequently, in publications reflecting the Azerbaijani position, the idea was developed that Vardanyan came to the region to strengthen Russian influence there.
Political scientist, expert on Central Asia Arkady Dubnov wrote after Vardanyan’s resignation that the businessman “has exhausted his resources as an Armenian politician”, that his figure no longer fits into the plans to resolve the Karabakh conflict and he is no longer needed by all parties, “including external, that in Moscow, that in Washington, that in Europe.
Later, in a conversation with The Insider, Dubnov stressed that he does not consider Vardanyan to be a protege of the Kremlin and believes in the sincerity of his desire to work for the benefit of Artsakh.
“He wants to look decent, showing that he is under pressure, but he is really very emotional about his promises to help Karabakh. This is the reason for his statement that he will stay there and work informally.”
“As a result of the Armenian-Turkish, perhaps, warming, as a result of the fact that Baku got what it wanted and the irritation was removed, now the process can begin. This also applies to the Lachin corridor and the deblockade on the Armenian-Turkish border <which has been closed since 1993>. One way or another, the Armenians have shown that they are ready to compromise.”
During a meeting with Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan in February, Aliyev reiterated that he was ready to negotiate on Karabakh only if Ruben Vardanyan resigned.
On February 23, President of the unrecognized republic Arayik Harutyunyan dismissed Vardanyan. In his statement on this occasion, he said that he and Vardanyan have a common goal – an independent Artsakh, however, “short-term approaches have certain tactical differences, which are based on the difference in our perception of certain factors, including the highly unpredictable instability in the world and the region, methods of defense “red lines”, the efficiency of using Armenian resources and levers of influence”. At the same time, Harutyunyan made it clear that Vardanyan's resignation is not "execution of the directive of Azerbaijan."
As political scientist, economist, senior researcher at the Caucasus Institute (Yerevan) Grant Mikaelyan told The Insider, the resumption of the negotiation process is most likely due to the resignation of Ruben Vardanyan from the post of State Minister of Artsakh.
“Most likely, this is connected, since at a government meeting, which was chaired by the President of Nagorno-Karabakh, he said that he was dismissing Vardanyan so that the resources of Artsakh would not be exhausted. This means that Arayik Harutyunyan linked the blockade to Vardanyan's personality, to the fact that he holds the position [of state minister]. Most likely, Ilham Aliyev also linked the blockade with Vardanyan. Although, as we can see, Vardanyan has resigned, but the blockade has not yet been lifted.”
On February 22, the International Court of Justice in The Hague ordered Azerbaijan to unblock the Lachin corridor.
“Unfortunately, unlike national legislation, international law does not provide for mechanisms of direct coercion, for example, as happens in the case of a court decision, when the police or bailiffs act. There are no such mechanisms, and at the moment it is just an instrument of legal and political pressure. For a concrete result, a coordinated position of the UN Security Council is needed.”
According to the Armenian side, issues related to the restoration of traffic along the Lachin corridor, as well as electricity and gas supply, were discussed at the March 1 talks. The Azerbaijani side stated that the issue of "integration" of Karabakh into Azerbaijan was also discussed, but the authorities of the unrecognized republic claim that this topic was not on the agenda.
“There are several problems here. One of them is that the negotiations are rather closed and far from all information gets into the public field. Our experience of the Karabakh negotiations suggests that the parties can make public statements, and sometimes these statements can be more weighty than those that the parties made during the negotiations. Even if this topic was not discussed, but the Azerbaijani side says after the talks that it was discussed, this will have a serious impact on the course of the process. The Azerbaijani side thus declares that the goal of the negotiations is the complete vertical subjugation of Artsakh. We have a situation where the positions of the parties do not correspond to each other.
There is another problem: it is not clear in what capacity the parties are negotiating. How does Azerbaijan see it: negotiations between authorities and autonomy? Or communities? Or are these negotiations between the two countries, as they see it from the Armenian side? Starting with the format, there are a lot of questions.”
The meeting was held at the headquarters of the Russian peacekeeping forces stationed in Karabakh, with the participation of the commander of the contingent, Major General Andrei Volkov.
“The degree of influence of Russian peacekeepers on the situation is not very high, and it is gradually decreasing. A situation has arisen where Russian peacekeepers stop small incidents involving several dozen people, but Russian peacekeepers do not influence anything that goes to the political level. In negotiations, their role is more of an organizational one, since there is no direct communication between Baku and Stepanakert, and Russian peacekeepers can provide such communication, provide premises. But they do not have their own political position.
Moreover, from Moscow's statements, we can conclude that Russia does not have it either, because, according to the Russian Foreign Ministry, Moscow's goal is an agreement between the parties. It is clear that there are probably some other, unspoken goals, but such goals can hang in the air for a very long time and can hardly be realized. Accordingly, Russia's position can be perceived as neutral, in the sense that it is very weakly expressed. So for now, Russian peacekeepers are stabilizing the situation, but no more.”