The meeting between Putin and Xi Jinping was the second since the beginning of the war after the conversation as part of the SCO summit in Samarkand in September 2022. At that time, a full-fledged bilateral meeting did not happen: the conversation between the presidents was relatively short and not face to face, but accompanied by SCO diplomats, as well as a symbolically divided long table – a detail that many analysts paid attention to, reinforcing arguments about the growing asymmetry and distance in relations between the two countries. The upcoming meeting so far looks like the complete opposite and, apparently, promises more productive and substantive discussions.
The importance of this visit for global politics, however, lies not only in the willingness of the Chinese leader to discuss something with Putin. Today, the context of relations between China and Russia includes many other fundamentally important elements – in particular, the final re-election of Xi Jinping to the role of President of the PRC; Chinese diplomacy in Europe; a "peace plan" recently proposed by China to resolve the conflict in Ukraine; US intelligence reports on possible Chinese arms supplies to Russia; and growing tensions between China and NATO. All these elements are closely interconnected and intertwined with each other.
Activation of the PRC in the foreign arena and the failure of the European tour
First, of course, we should talk about the re-election of Xi Jinping for a third term: now it has finally officially ended with Xi being awarded the post of President of the PRC. Despite the fact that Xi secured de facto power over the country back in February, extending his leadership over the party, the renewal of the presidency is an important symbolic gesture that demonstrates the superiority of Xi Jinping over his predecessors, the Constitution, as well as the unbreakable rules of Deng Xiaoping before him. . This re-election, although somewhat predetermined, is not at all an everyday or formal event, but a turning point in the political history of modern China. Such a context, coupled with the largest protests in recent decades throughout China and economic problems, is pushing the head of the country to try to strengthen his own authority and explains the activation of China and Xi Jinping personally in the international arena.
This is evident not only in the example of Chinese relations with Russia and Ukraine, but also in other diplomatic areas. Thus, 2023 for China began with the World Economic Forum in Davos, a very significant international event for the economy and trade. The speech of Vice Premier Liu He of the State Council of the People's Republic of China was, in a sense, unusual for China. It can be described as an investment pitch: in it, Liu He emphasized opening up the Chinese economy and called on foreign partners for economic cooperation. This was followed by further attempts to improve economic and political relations between China and European countries. In February 2023, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi undertook a week-long diplomatic trip, during which he visited Germany, Italy and Hungary, and also met with Josep Borrell.
The renewal of the presidency is an important symbolic gesture that demonstrates the superiority of Xi Jinping over his predecessors and the Constitution
After a European tour on his way to China, Wang Yi also visited Moscow, where he held talks with Lavrov and met with Putin. However, the Chinese Foreign Ministry's statement following the results of the meetings was, in the best traditions of Chinese diplomacy, vague and non-binding. Apparently, the main focus of the conversations was a possible meeting between Xi and Putin. Conversations with European politicians, it seems, were still the main purpose of the trip, and the main final point in the diplomatic mission was Wang Yi's speech at the Munich Conference. There, in addition to calling for the return of friendship between China and Europe, he spoke about the need to strengthen the sovereignty and independence of Europe from the United States, and also attacked Washington with accusations of selfish motives regarding the war in Ukraine and in a “hysterical” reaction to the Chinese balloon. This tactic was subsequently described by European political and security experts (in particular, Michael Clarke, professor of war studies at King's College London) as a failure for the entire trip. Relations between the United States and Europe have only strengthened against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, and China's unwillingness to directly condemn Russia has remained a key issue for Europe in any diplomatic negotiations with Beijing.
However, the aggressively anti-American position of Wang Yi at the speech is not surprising. Apart from the fact that Chinese diplomacy in general rarely disdains the use of anti-Americanism as an ideological justification for foreign policy, at the time of Wang Yi's Eurotour, relations between China and the United States were aggravated. In particular, the incident with the “spy balloon” served as an occasion – in early February 2023, the US military shot down a Chinese balloon that managed to fly over a considerable part of North America. The White House has accused China of trying to spy on the United States and violating American airspace — which is unusual in itself, given that there are intelligence methods that do not need such aggravations. Beijing, after a long silence, nevertheless admitted that the balloon belongs to them, but denied accusations of espionage and stated that the balloon was civilian and was used for meteorological research, and it got into the United States by accident.
Rising Tensions in Asia
The balloon incident followed another, perhaps much more important, development in China-NATO relations—and the US in particular. Thus, at the end of January this year, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg visited South Korea and Japan to discuss strengthening bilateral ties. The key topics for discussion between the Alliance and the defense ministers of Korea and Japan were, firstly, the war in Ukraine, and secondly, the growing influence and threat of China in the Asian region, in particular in Taiwan. Stoltenberg expressed the Alliance's concerns about China's military policy: in recent years, Xi Jinping has engaged in an army modernization program and investments in nuclear weapons, while not participating in strategic arms control agreements with the United States. Indeed, modernizing the army is one of Xi Jinping's key political goals, along with maintaining economic growth. According to the Institute for Strategic Studies , as early as 2022, the Chinese army has undergone significant transformation and modernization, including primarily the development of new supply chains for the construction of heavy equipment. For example, thanks to this, up to 70% of Chinese tanks in service in 2022 meet the most modern military standards.
The reaction to Stoltenberg's trip in the Chinese authorities was extremely negative. NATO, according to China, thus seeks to strengthen the "Cold War mentality", that is, to try to squeeze China to the periphery and move on to passive, but direct confrontation. Beijing's other concern remains the direct spread of the Alliance in the Asia-Pacific region – here the argument is in some ways reminiscent of Russian claims about the danger of NATO expansion to the east. Xi sees NATO's presence in the region as a restriction of China's freedom, a violation of its security space and regional interests. This, from his point of view, is little different from interfering in internal affairs and violating sovereignty – the main "red line" for China.
Uncertainty, however, remains the main factor in China-NATO relations in Asia. The Asian policy of the alliance is quite vague – for example, for a long time, one of the main aspirations of NATO was not to take too "anti-Chinese position". With all the awareness of the possible threat from China and potential rivalry, US and NATO attempts to influence the region remained rather limited and relied on the “Quad”, a four-way scheme of relations in the region between the US, Australia, India and China. At the same time, attitudes towards NATO and the format itself within the group remained controversial, with frequent opposition from India. Considering China's huge economic influence in the region, as well as its heavy emphasis on economic diplomacy and interdependence building, this four-way scheme is very difficult, but the US and the Alliance cannot refuse it.
Uncertainty remains key factor in China-NATO relations in Asia
Ukrainian factor for China
Against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between China and the United States, the factor of war in Ukraine is becoming especially important. A number of analysts believe that, despite China's disinterest in a protracted war, it nevertheless creates a distraction for NATO – and, moreover, devastates its weapons depots, which means reducing its military potential. NATO analysts reasoned in the same vein when, at the end of February, they announced the possibility of supplying Chinese weapons to Russia. Stoltenberg said US and other NATO intelligence see signs that such a course of action is being considered in Beijing. At the same time, he stressed that there is no evidence of a decision being made or direct preparations for deliveries yet. Following Stoltenberg's statement, a number of American diplomats issued warnings to China about the inadmissibility of direct support for Russia: otherwise, China could be isolated from the world, subjected to sanctions, and this would bring nothing but damage to all parties.
Although there has been no new data on possible arms shipments since then, Politico recently published the results of an investigation that shows that some Chinese companies (notably China North Industries and Da-Jiang Innovations) have supplied Russian companies with UAV parts, bulletproof vests and low-caliber rifles through Turkey and the UAE. However, we are most likely not talking about government-approved supplies to support Russia in the war. Despite the fact that such equipment can be used by Russia in Ukraine, in general, all these are dual-use products, the volumes of supplies are relatively small, and cooperation between the companies was carried out before the start of the war. In addition, no evidence of Russian use of Chinese rifles or bulletproof vests on the battlefield has yet been found , and the products could indeed be used for their direct, non-military purpose.
At the same time, despite the growing tension between the West and China, in recent months, China has not been going to open confrontation. On the contrary, he actively strives to prove himself as a mediator and peacemaker. So, on February 24, the Chinese Foreign Ministry published the long-announced – including as part of Wang Yi's speech at the Munich Conference – and for a long time promoted "Xi Jinping's peace plan", which is officially titled "China's position on the Ukrainian conflict." In fact, the "plan" does not propose any specific actions, but rather a set of general principles and proposals, such as respect for the territorial integrity of all countries – without specifying what exactly this means regarding the war in Ukraine and the occupation of its territories by Russia – and also a ceasefire, the resumption of peace talks, the rejection of the "cold war mentality" and so on. The reaction of Western countries to this "peace plan" was cold. Thus, EU foreign policy spokeswoman Nabila Massrali criticized it as "blurring the lines between aggressor and victim" and "shifting the focus on the allegedly legitimate concerns of the aggressor." Ursula von der Leyen, in turn, accused China of bias and selectivity.
Despite growing tensions between the West and China, China has not gone into open confrontation in recent months.
However, the rhetoric of Western countries has softened over time, relations between NATO and China are apparently reaching a plateau, and a number of experts and the media have begun to talk about the possibility of China being relatively sincerely interested in peacekeeping attempts. The main argument lies in Xi Jinping’s ambitions already mentioned in the article to restore his own authority – he may seek to build a new global identity for China as a “big brother” and a peacemaker in international politics. This is also indicated by China's efforts in other regions: for example, on March 10, it became known about the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, broken off 7 years ago, with the filing and mediation of China. It is possible that against the backdrop of one diplomatic success, Xi may make significant efforts to direct the war in Ukraine.
Skepticism about China's true intentions, however, has not disappeared. Thus, some analysts believe that there is no talk of sincere peacekeeping, and the purpose of Xi Jinping's trip is to strengthen ties with Russia and its dependence on China. Thus, Xi seeks to support Russia with a view to its further “vassalization”, and everything else is a veil for Western observers. Such a development of events remains realistic, but not the only one or even a priority. It is worth remembering that Beijing’s position during the entire year of the war was extremely restrained, and the growth of Russia’s dependence on China happened by itself, without any extra efforts and personal intervention of Xi. At the same time, the serious efforts of Xi and Wang Yi to strengthen relations with Europe suggest that Beijing is not yet ready to risk them. Active and serious investments in peace initiatives – in particular, in the deal between Iran and Saudi Arabia – at least indicate Xi's interest in peacekeeping. Another indication of the possibility of Beijing’s attempts to resolve the conflict was Xi’s plans to negotiate with Zelensky: these plans were met with enthusiasm not only from Ukraine, but also from Western politicians. So, the White House came out with support for this conversation. “We have long called on President Xi to negotiate with Ukraine,” US national security adviser Jake Sullivan said and confirmed that President Joe Biden is ready to personally discuss such negotiations with Xi.
Even if China is really sincerely going to engage in peacekeeping, this does not mean that Beijing's efforts will be successful or even fair in relation to Ukraine, but it may mean a further rejection of direct military support for Russia. And consequently, the prevention of further and irreversible deterioration in relations between China and NATO.