Report of the KGB under the Council of Ministers of the USSR to the Central Committee of the CPSU on the statement of the leaders of the Communist Parties of France and Italy about criminal prosecutions for dissent in the USSR
December 29, 1975
No. 3213-A
Top secret
Bourgeois propaganda has recently been actively using in subversive activities against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries the well-known statements of the leaders of the Communist Parties of France and Italy on issues relating to Soviet democracy, the rights and freedoms of citizens, and the suppression of the activities of antisocial elements. Materials broadcast by Western radio stations on this issue become known to a wide circle of Soviet citizens, who express bewilderment at such a position of the leadership of the Communist Parties of France and Italy.
At the same time, the "special" views of the leaders of these parties cause the activation of hostile elements like Sakharov, Medvedev and some others. They see in these views manifestations of “commonality” with their position on the issue of “civil rights”, “persecution of dissidents”, etc. According to operational data, Sakharov recently said: “Marchais’s open reaction would have been impossible without the activity of the democrats.” Medvedev said in a close circle: "Our views and views are consistent with the position of the Italian communists." Indicative is the act of addressing the wife of the well-known anti-Soviet Plyushch to J. Marchais, in which she specifically emphasized that "Plyushch shares many of the views of Marchais." Solzhenitsyn also used similar references to justify his anti-state activities.
The problem that arises in connection with the statements of some leaders of the Communist parties of France and Italy, in addition to the ideological and theoretical aspect, also has a practical side related to ensuring the security of the Soviet state.
In this case, the friends are clearly yielding to the propaganda pressure of the enemy. The thesis put forward by L'Humanite about granting freedom of action under socialism to those who "affirm their disagreement with the system worked out by the majority" objectively helps the opponents of socialism in their attempts to create a legal opposition in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to undermine the leading role of the communist and workers' parties .
The secret services and ideological centers of imperialism are making efforts to defame Soviet laws, presenting them as outdated, dogmatic and inconsistent with the spirit of international documents, in particular the Declaration of Human Rights. Anti-social elements within our country cling to these statements. Unfortunately, the well-known statements about democratic freedoms under socialism that have appeared in the communist press of France and Italy have something in common with them. Here the real conditions of the class struggle in the modern period are ignored, the subversive activities of world imperialism and its agents are underestimated.
Comrades who make such statements, even after the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, do not want to see that even under the conditions of developed socialism, despite the monolithic and political unity of society, anti-Soviet manifestations still persist in one form or another to a greater or lesser extent.
The available data testify to the desire of the special services and ideological centers of the enemy to unite the actions of hostile elements of all shades. Particularly active work is being done to create an anti-Soviet illegal press organ, designed to play the role of an organizational center. In their subversive activities against the Soviet Union, the enemies are counting on those elements who, by virtue of their past belonging to the exploiting classes, politically harmful and criminal activities, can take the path of anti-Soviet struggle. In our country, these are former punishers and other accomplices of the Nazi invaders, Vlasovites, members of the gangster armed underground in Ukraine, the Baltic states, Belarus, in some regions of Central Asia and the North Caucasus, nationalist and other elements hostile to the Soviet system. The number of such people is determined by hundreds of thousands of people. Many of them have atoned for their guilt and are honestly working, but there are those in this milieu who even now do not miss an opportunity to harm Soviet society and, under certain conditions, will take the path of open struggle, up to armed struggle.
State security agencies are taking measures to study the situation in this environment and to control the activities of persons hatching anti-Soviet designs. Guided by the requirements of Soviet laws, the KGB resolutely suppresses especially dangerous state crimes.
As for the measures of criminal prosecution against the so-called. “dissidents”, by which in the West they usually mean persons whose actions fall under Article 70 (anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda) and 1901 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR (dissemination of deliberately false fabrications discrediting the Soviet system), then the figures on this subject are as follows . For the period from 1967 (Article 1901 was introduced in September 1966) to 1975, 1,583 people were convicted under these articles. During the previous nine-year period (1958-1966), the number of those convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda was 3,448 people. By the way, in 1958, that is, just in the period that is often called in the West the “period of liberalization” and to which N. S. Khrushchev’s statement (January 27, 1959) refers to the absence of “facts of bringing to justice for political crimes”, under Article 70, 1,416 people were convicted, that is, almost as many as in the last nine years.
As of December 20, 1975, 860 convicted of especially dangerous state crimes, including anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, are serving their sentences in the ITU – a total of 261 people who are held in two corrective labor colonies.
The current decrease in the number of state crimes is the result of the further strengthening of the moral and political unity of Soviet society, the devotion of Soviet people to the cause of socialism, and the resolute suppression of anti-Soviet actions by hostile elements.
In accordance with the instructions of the XXI-XXIV party congresses and the Central Committee of the CPSU, the state security agencies are focusing on preventive work to prevent state crimes, in the period 1971-1974. 63,108 people were prophylactic. During the same period, the activities of 1,839 anti-Soviet groups were suppressed at the stage of formation only through preventive measures. Prevention measures continue to be the main ones in the activities of the authorities.
Along with prevention, operational and other measures not related to criminal prosecution were used and continue to be used. A number of dangerous nationalist, revisionist, and other anti-Soviet groupings have been decomposed at the stage of emergence. The compromise of the authorities who inspired anti-social manifestations made it possible to prevent undesirable consequences in a number of regions of the country. Measures such as the deprivation of some persons of Soviet citizenship and their expulsion abroad also justified themselves (Solzhenitsyn, Chalidze, Maksimov, Krasin, Litvinov, Yesenin-Volpin and others). The improvement of the operational situation was also facilitated by the permission to leave many extremists from the Soviet Union for Israel.
"Improvement of the operational situation was also facilitated by the permission to leave many extremists from the Soviet Union to Israel"
At the same time, it is impossible at the moment to refuse criminal prosecution of persons opposing the Soviet system, since this would entail an increase in especially dangerous state crimes and antisocial manifestations. Experience shows that the activity of "dissidents", which at first was limited to anti-Soviet propaganda, later in a number of cases took on such dangerous forms as terrorist manifestations, organized underground in order to overthrow Soviet power, establishing contacts with foreign special services involved in espionage, etc. From what has been said It is clear that the refusal to actively suppress the politically harmful actions of "dissidents" and other hostile elements, as the French and Italian comrades want, could cause the most serious negative consequences. It seems to us that it is impossible to make fundamental concessions on this issue, since they would inevitably entail additional demands that are unacceptable to us.
All of the above confirms the correctness of our Party's line of resolute struggle "for protecting Soviet society from the actions of hostile elements." In accordance with this, the state security organs will continue to resolutely suppress any anti-Soviet activity on the territory of our country. It would be expedient to pursue a line that has justified itself towards a reasonable combination of preventive and other operational-Chekist measures with criminal prosecution measures in cases where this is necessary.
The KGB will strictly ensure that the so-called "dissidents" cannot create an organized anti-Soviet underground and carry out anti-Soviet activities, including from "legal positions" (Sakharov "committee for the protection of human rights", "Amnesty International group", holding meetings with certain political goals, etc.).
It would be desirable, at an opportune moment, to hold appropriate conversations at a high level with the French and Italian comrades, in which it would be explained to them that the fight against the so-called "dissidents" is for us not an abstract question of democracy in general, but a vital necessity for protecting the security of the Soviet state. Our measures to suppress the activities of "dissidents" and other anti-Soviet elements are by no means of any "mass" nature, but only concern individuals who have not stopped their activities even after appropriate official warnings and warnings. These measures are based on the observance of socialist legality and are in full conformity with Lenin's propositions for the development of socialist democracy. When carrying out the most acute actions, we take into account, as far as possible, the interests of friends working in the conditions of bourgeois-democratic states.
In connection with the fact that the speeches of the French and Italian comrades on questions of democratic freedoms under socialism arouse bewilderment among the Soviet people, it seems expedient in our propaganda to more fully show the advantages of the Soviet social and state system, the truly popular character of Soviet democracy, the vital interest of the working people of our country in unconditional observance of laws that grant Soviet citizens the broadest social and political rights. Special attention should be paid to the fact that the Soviet Constitution provides for the use of such rights and freedoms, including freedom of speech and assembly, only "in accordance with the interests of the working people and for the purpose of strengthening the socialist system."
"The Soviet Constitution provides for the use of freedom of speech and assembly, only "in accordance with the interests of the working people and in order to strengthen the socialist system""
It is on this class basis, in full compliance with the laws, that the anti-socialist activities of "dissidents" are suppressed. They are condemned not for "dissent", but for active criminal acts and subversive actions against the socialist system. Emphasize that the anti-social actions of hostile elements are connected with the influence of bourgeois propaganda, with the organized subversive activities of the imperialist special services of the anti-Soviet centers (Yakir, Dzyuba, Krasin and others publicly acknowledged such connections).
Show that real socialism is the embodiment of Lenin's ideas about the functions and role of the state in the period of building communism. To reveal the meaning of measures aimed at protecting the gains of socialism. Emphasize the special responsibility of the fraternal parties in power for the fate of society and the state.
CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE SECURITY COMMITTEE /Signature/ ANDROPOV
Corpus commentary
One of the rare documents that speaks about the general direction of the Soviet repressive policy of the 1960s-1980s, highlights the motives and hidden springs of this policy. Formally, this note is a response to the “Eurocommunist” criticism of political repressions in the USSR. But at the same time, the head of the KGB is trying to formulate, substantiate and explain to his colleagues from the Politburo his own understanding of the meaning and objectives of repression against dissidents carried out by his department.
The tonality and even the syntactic structure of individual fragments of the note are of particular interest. Usually, in the correspondence of the KGB with the Central Committee, the readiness of the bodies to implement the directives developed by the party leadership and carry out its orders is emphasized – in accordance with the traditional setting for the subordination of the main Soviet intelligence service to the party elite. Here Andropov, in fact, dictates to the Politburo how and by what criteria the KGB's fight against dissidents should be evaluated. In the final lines of the note, unexpected imperative phrases even appear: "Emphasize that …", "Show that …", "Reveal the meaning of measures …", "Emphasize special responsibility …". One gets the impression that the author of the note is giving directive instructions to the Central Committee on propagandistic support for the activities of the Committee. All this undoubtedly points to the markedly increased political weight of the KGB chairman in the Soviet leadership.
… well-known statements by the leaders of the communist parties of France and Italy on issues relating to Soviet democracy, the rights and freedoms of citizens, and the suppression of the activities of anti-social elements.
– I mean the future leaders of "Eurocommunism": the General Secretary of the PCI Enrico Berlinguer and the General Secretary of the PCF Georges Marchais, as well as the General Secretary of the Communist Party of Spain Santiago Carrillo, not mentioned here, and the leaders of a number of other, smaller Western Communist Parties – and their criticism of the repressions against Soviet dissidents .
… cause the activation of hostile elements like Sakharov, Medvedev and some others.
– These two names are named in this context for a reason. Roy Medvedev is one of the most famous representatives of the Soviet dissidents who adhered to the communist orientation, his political views were indeed close to "Eurocommunist". As for Sakharov, within the dissident community, his socio-political concepts were in most cases perceived as “left-liberal”.
… without the activity of the Democrats.
— “Democrats” Sakharov here, as well as in a number of his other statements and texts, calls (perhaps too broadly) Soviet dissidents.
Solzhenitsyn also used similar references to justify his anti-state activities.
– Solzhenitsyn's anti-communist convictions by 1975 were well known, and for the "Eurocommunists" he by no means made an exception.
The thesis put forward by L'Humanite is that under socialism freedom of action is granted to those who "assert their disagreement with the system worked out by the majority"…
– The newspaper L'Humanité is the central print organ of the French Communist Party. This refers to the assertions of L'Humanité that if they come to power, the French communists will not follow the path of the "Soviet comrades", but will preserve the political institutions of democracy, the multi-party system and will not persecute dissidents.
… even after the events in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, they don’t want to see …
– Such an argument looks strange, it was the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia that became the first impetus for the formation of "Eurocommunism".
… work is underway to create an anti-Soviet illegal press organ, designed to play the role of an organizational center.
– It is not clear what is meant.
…enemies are counting on those elements who, by virtue of their past belonging to the exploiting classes…can take the path of anti-Soviet struggle. In our country, these are former punishers and other accomplices of the Nazi occupiers, Vlasovites, members of the gangster armed underground …
— The statement about the presence in the USSR in the mid-1970s of “elements that in the past belonged to the exploiting classes” looks like an obvious absurdity. Also unknown are the facts of participation in dissident activity of "former punishers and other accomplices of the Nazi occupiers, Vlasovites." Some participants in the armed resistance of the second half of the 1940s and early 1950s in the Baltic States and Ukraine really joined the nationalist dissident movements of the 1960s and 1970s, but only in isolated cases. Объяснить появление этого абсурдного пассажа можно либо привычкой автора искать объяснение всех социально-политических явлений в «классовой борьбе», либо, что более вероятно, необходимостью отдать дань идеологическим ритуалам.
…цифровые данные на этот счет выглядят следующим обра зом <…> осуждено 1 583 человека. За предшествующий девятилетний период (1958–1966 гг.) число осужденных за антисоветскую агитацию и пропаганду составляло 3 448 человек.
— Цифрам, приведенным в записке Андропова, можно доверять, они почти совпадают с данными, содержащимися в других источниках (небольшие различия связаны, по-видимому, с особенностями статистического учета). Неясно, однако, учтены ли в них арестованные по названным статьям УК, но признанные невменяемыми и отправленные на принудительное лечение в психиатрические больницы.
Кстати говоря, в 1958 году… по статье 70 было осуждено 1 416 человек, то есть почти столько, сколько за все последние девять лет.
— Ст. 70 УК РСФСР об «антисоветской пропаганде и агитации» (как и аналогичные статьи в УК союзных республик) появилась только в новом Уголовном кодексе, вступившем в силу в 1961 году. Андропов имеет в виду аналогичную статью УК, действовавшего в 1958 году, — широкоизвестную ст. 5810.
По состоянию на 20 декабря 1975 года в ИТУ отбывают наказание 860 осужденных за особо опасные государственные преступления, в том числе за антисоветскую агитацию и пропаганду — всего 261 человек…
— Мы не располагаем данными, позволяющими подтвердить или опровергнуть эти цифры. Странно, что осужденных за «антисоветскую агитацию и пропаганду» получается заметное меньшинство, тогда как, по статистике, с 1956 года именно они составляли абсолютное большинство среди лиц, ежегодно судимых за «особо опасные государственные преступления». Впрочем, к 1975 году в лагерях еще находилось множество приговоренных в 1950-х к длительным срокам заключения (до 25 лет) не за «агитацию и пропаганду», а за другие, «особо опасные государственные преступления», — военные преступники, а также прибалтийские и украинские «повстанцы-националисты». Возможно, именно за счет этих так называемых долгосрочников и возник перекос в статистике.
…которые содержатся в двух исправительно-трудовых колониях.
— Мордовские (Дубравлаг) и Пермские (Скальнинские) политические лагеря. Кроме того, Андропов забыл упомянуть 2-й («политический») корпус Владимирской тюрьмы.
…в период 1971–1974 гг. было профилактировано 63 108 человек. За этот же период только путем профилактики пресечена на стадии формирования деятельность 1 839 антисоветских групп.
— В практике КГБ «профилактирование» включало в себя широкий спектр неправовых методов воздействия на недовольных граждан — от приватных «воспитательных бесед», включавших в себя увещевания, запугивание и шантаж, до публичных проработок на партийных, комсомольских и профсоюзных собраниях. Установка на профилактирование как основное направление работы органов была дана Н. С. Хрущевым в начале 1959 года.
Приводимые Андроповым данные об «антисоветских группах» и отдельных гражданах, подвергшихся профилактированию в 1971–1974 годах, входят в противоречие с официальными заявлениями об «идейно-политическом единстве советского народа». Но автору «сообщения» не до демагогических формул, напротив, его задача — убедить своих адресатов в том, что инакомыслие представляет реальную опасность для советского строя.
…лишение некоторых лиц советского гражданства и выдворение их за границу (Солженицын, Чалидзе, Максимов, Красин, Литвинов, Есенин-Вольпин и другие).
— Строго говоря, слово «выдворение» корректно только в отношении А. И. Солженицына. В. Н. Чалидзе и В. Е. Максимов выехали за рубеж как советские граждане и были лишены гражданства, уже находясь за границей. То есть были не «выдворены», а скорее «выдавлены». То же можно сказать о П. М. Литвинове и А. С. Есенине-Вольпине, которые после недвусмысленных угроз КГБ покинули СССР по стандартному «израильскому каналу». В. А. Красин уехал в феврале 1975 года, сразу после помилования и досрочного освобождения из ссылки (о «деле Якира и Красина» см. во вступлении к гл. 4). Насколько добровольным был его отъезд, мы не знаем.
…разрешение выезда многим экстремистам из Советского Союза в Израиль.
— Речь идет о наиболее активных участниках движения евреев-отказников. В их случае КГБ оказывался перед дилеммой: как можно скорее отпустить в Израиль (и тем стимулировать остающихся отказников к повышенной активности) или репрессировать. В разных ситуациях этот вопрос решался по-разному.
…отказаться в данный момент от уголовного преследования лиц, выступающих против советского строя, невозможно, поскольку это повлекло бы за собой увеличение особо опасных государственных преступлений и антиобщественных проявлений.
— Ключевая мысль этого документа. Глава КГБ заявляет, что невозможно сдержать рост инакомыслия в стране, не прибегая к арестам. Репрессивная политика, проводимая его ведомством, является единственным залогом стабильности советского режима.
Опыт показывает, что деятельность «диссидентов», которая вначале ограничивается антисоветской пропагандой, впоследствии в ряде случаев принимала такие опасные формы, как террористические проявления, организованное подполье в целях свержения Советской власти, установление связей с зарубежными спецслужбами, занимающимися шпионажем, и др.
— Ничего подобного опыт на тот момент не показывал. Возможно, Андропов экстраполирует на ситуацию в Советском Союзе середины 1970-х свои впечатления от Венгерской революции 1956 года (он тогда занимал пост посла СССР в Венгрии).
КГБ будет строго следить за тем, чтобы так называемые «диссиденты» не могли создать организованное антисоветское подполье и проводить антисоветскую деятельность, в том числе и с «легальных позиций»…
— Еще одна ключевая фраза. КГБ занят не «искоренением инакомыслия», а предотвращением неконтролируемого роста диссидентской активности. Причем ее открытые проявления волнуют Андропова едва ли не больше, чем «подпольные».
В дальнейшем, после начала афганской войны и в особенности после польских событий (революция «Солидарности» 1980–1981 годов), Андропов занял более решительную позицию: деятельность КГБ в первой половине 1980-х была направлена на полную ликвидацию диссидентства.
…сахаровский «комитет защиты прав человека», «группа Международной амнистии», проведение сборищ с определенными политическими целями и т. п.
— В частности, за пределы дозволенного выходят любые диссидентские объединения и ассоциации. Что подразумевается под «сборищами с политическими целями», неясно, возможно, публичные акции, вроде митингов и демонстраций.
…советская Конституция предусматривает использование таких прав и свобод, в том числе свободы слова и собраний, только «в соответствии с интересами трудящихся и в целях укрепления социалистического строя».
— Здесь содержится заочная полемика с «диссидентской» трактовкой ст. 125 Конституции СССР 1936 года. В этой статье говорилось: «В соответствии с интересами трудящихся и в целях укрепления социалистического строя гражданам СССР гарантируется законом: а) свобода слова; б) свобода печати; в) свобода собраний и митингов; г) свобода уличных шествий и демонстраций». Многие диссиденты, склонные к правовому обоснованию своей деятельности, утверждали, что ее следует понимать так: права и свободы граждан гарантируются безусловно, так как они соответствуют интересам трудящихся и служат укреплению социалистического строя.
Подчеркнуть, что антиобщественные действия враждебных элементов связаны с влиянием буржуазной пропаганды, с организованной подрывной деятельностью империалистических спецслужб антисоветских центров…
— Возвращение к традиционной концепции инакомыслия как результата идеологической диверсии, организуемой из-за рубежа, по всей видимости, противоречит общему смыслу записки, акцентирующей внимание на серьезных внутренних резервах советского диссидентства. Однако это противоречие — кажущееся. В финальной части Андропов переходит от объяснения феномена диссидентства к формулам для пропагандистского обеспечения дальнейших репрессий против инакомыслящих.
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