Whenever China is discussed in the United States, the tone of the discussion almost immediately turns accusatory and threatening. American politicians regularly warn Beijing that in the event of the slightest support from Moscow, they will respond swiftly, threatening harsh sanctions. The same applies to the second point of controversy – Taiwan – where confrontation and threats are moving to a new, military level.
Washington's tactics are understandable. Despite all the contradictions and trade wars of the past few years, the two countries remain at a record level of economic interdependence. In a sense, this gives Xi some “backlash”: “sanctions will be destructive for the United States as well, which means that we will be forgiven a lot up to a certain limit.” In this context, aggressive American rhetoric and an emphasis on active deterrence based on open threats serve the purpose of destroying this notion of backlash: “the slightest offense and you will be enemy number one for us.” By and large, this is a policy adjustment towards Russia, where the sanctions and the overall international reaction after the 2008 war and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 were largely disproportionate and did not help prevent the invasion of Ukraine.
The United States makes it clear to China: "the slightest misconduct – and you will be enemy number one for us"
In the case of China, in a good way, the threats associated with the economy should also carry more weight than for Russia: Xi builds his image inside China not just on “stability” and the role of a great power, but on rapid economic growth and an increase in welfare of citizens. This partly helps him keep both the elites and the population under control – and Western sanctions, of course, will hit economic growth and well-being very, very hard, perhaps more than Russia.
The main weakness of the current US policy is the so-called spiral model: that is, a situation where two opposing sides with increased hostility mutually react to each subsequent action, bringing relations to a critical point. And indeed, apparently, relations between Beijing and Washington are developing in this direction. Tension in relations is growing at an unprecedented pace, anti-American rhetoric in Chinese political circles and the media has been gaining momentum almost since the time of Mao, the leaders of the countries are moving to almost direct threats of the use of military force; and the emphasis on the policy of containment does not deter such an escalation at all. Should we be afraid that China could be inadvertently pushed into further isolation and cooperation with Russia? And what to do?
Tensions between the US and China are growing at an unprecedented pace
Obviously, the American establishment cannot sharply change the rhetoric to the opposite and switch to friendliness and positive reinforcement, to a "carrot" instead of a stick. And because (justifiably) afraid of repeating the Russian scenario, and because it could have a sharply opposite effect. Xi may decide that Western partners have "gone weak" and try to take advantage of this.
And here another player enters the scene – Europe. European foreign policy towards authoritarian countries such as Russia and China has traditionally coincided with the United States – both as a NATO partner and as a region largely dependent on Washington's strategic support. In the first year of the war, this was also noticeable in relation to China, although less sharply; But now the situation seems to have changed.
Despite the fact that the element of emphasis on the "whip" and the policy of containment is certainly still present in European diplomacy, it is much less acute. A number of European politicians – in particular Ursula von der Leyen – often and quite clearly warn Beijing of the inevitable responsibility for possible support for Russia, threaten with harsh sanctions and the collapse of economic ties. However, unlike the United States, European countries, in parallel with threats, began to extend their hand with a “carrot”.
Europe, in contrast to the United States, in parallel with the threats began to extend its hand to China with a "carrot"
You need to understand that Europe is doing this for a reason. In the case of Sino-European relations, the context and mood of China is fundamentally different: Xi is clearly very interested in improving relations with Europe; in contrast to the aggressively accusatory rhetoric towards the United States, Chinese diplomats communicate almost amicably with their European counterparts. Even during the speech of Vice Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China Liu He at the Davos Forum in 2023, where the politician spoke about the opening of the Chinese economy and the desire to attract foreign investment and strengthen economic ties with other countries, it was clear that such a “selling” pitch was aimed specifically at side of the countries of Europe, inviting them to strengthen relations undermined by covid and war.
Europe listened – and soon received Wang Yi, the head of Chinese diplomacy, as a guest. In February, he visited several European capitals on a tour, including Budapest, Rome and Paris, and, perhaps most interestingly and exceptionally, was invited to the Munich Security Conference, the same one where Putin delivered his landmark speech. Of course, Wang Yi could not perform any diplomatic miracles: he did not conclude alliances, did not convince European colleagues of China's devotion to the ideals of peace and common values; and he did not justify the expectations of the public, once again refusing to openly condemn Moscow. However, this visit was a small but stepping stone towards a new European foreign policy towards China.
The next, much more significant, milestone, which has been talked about for more than one week, was Macron's personal visit to China, where his heart is heartfelt! Xi Jinping accepted. The trip itself is a complex and multi-layered event, both from the point of view of domestic French politics, and the internal politics of the EU, and Euro-American relations, but even without analyzing every aspect of it, several conclusions can be drawn from it.
First, Macron undertook the trip, accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen as a representative of the EU – this was clearly done to demonstrate the unity of Europe and the commitment of Paris to common European values and policies. Macron was not negotiating with Xi alone, but with European allies behind his back, and sought to emphasize this. Von der Leyen played the role of the bad cop and spoke mainly about China's responsibility to the world and the need to condemn Russia, while Macron was in charge of all other aspects of the negotiations – also, apparently, a measured and deliberate move; the same "carrots and sticks", but on a smaller scale.
Secondly, the French president arrived accompanied by a number (fifty people!) of French business representatives, giving the trip a pragmatic touch, without dwelling on symbolism and general communiqués. This is a very important element – business and economic ties are the very carrot that Europe can offer China, and Macron not only spoke about it, but also brought it for a tasting, demonstrating a real willingness to cooperate and strengthen ties – if, of course, they are observed certain conditions.
Macron in China showed a real willingness to cooperate and strengthen ties
Thirdly, Macron was received cordially, even cordially. He spent three days in China—longer, in terms of symbolism in diplomacy, than Xi ended up in Moscow—all the while in Xi’s company. He even invited Macron to Guangzhou, his hometown, a friendly and very personal gesture rarely honored by Western politicians in China.
Despite the fact that during the visit, of course, the topic of the war in Ukraine was regularly raised, which Chinese diplomats did their best to avoid, Xi was in no hurry to end the conversation hastily; on the contrary, he was ready to listen – which, however, does not mean listening at all – to the claims of European colleagues and did his best to note the uniqueness and friendliness of the negotiations.
Of course, despite all this, the miracle did not happen: China did not change its neutrality with regard to the war, did not give real guarantees of non-support for Russia and did not promise to influence Russia in order to stop it. At the same time, the visit turned out to be much more productive than Xi's trip to Moscow. Representatives of French companies were able to conduct real negotiations with their Chinese counterparts and concluded 18 quite tangible agreements, in contrast to the memorandums of understanding signed in Moscow.
Macron and von der Leyen's visit turned out to be much more productive than Xi's trip to Moscow
More importantly, following Macron's visit, several other high-ranking meetings were scheduled at once: for example, the head of European diplomacy Josep Borrell is due to arrive in Beijing in April, followed by the German Foreign Ministry Annalena Berbock. This amount of interaction between Western politicians and China is, frankly, unprecedented, especially at a time of strained relations. At the same time, one must understand that it is difficult to overestimate the role of such contacts. It is regular high-ranking contacts that are usually considered one of the main obstacles to escalation and conflicts; they speak of the countries' mutual interest in finding common ground, and readiness, and most importantly, the realism of the dialogue. There is no such dialogue, whatever its results, not only between China and the United States, but also between China and Russia.
Europe is clearly striving to develop its own, different from the American, strategy for working with China, and so far it is yielding, if not the most significant, but tangible results. Of course, there are no guarantees of the effectiveness of such an approach: the behavior of authoritarian regimes, and China in particular, is always difficult to predict. However, given that Europe, even with an original strategy, still acts as a united front with other NATO partners and regularly emphasizes this, the risk that such a policy will be perceived by China as weakness is minimal. At the same time, this significantly reduces the risk of further sliding into a “spiral”, which means that it allows Western countries to balance between political carrots and sticks, which is extremely difficult for individual countries. Thus, Europe may be able to prevent a further deterioration of the "spiral" in China's relations with the West and – this cannot be ruled out – may finally convince Beijing to turn its back on Moscow.
