Kerim Has, independent analyst on Turkish-Russian and international relations, candidate of political sciences:
Who will get the votes of the eliminated candidate?
“The opposition has the strength to gather its electorate for the second round, because for the first time Erdogan saw the risk of defeat. It is possible and necessary to mobilize the protest electorate. But the opposition's chances of winning in the second round are less. As for Sinan Ogan, he does not really have his own electorate. Yes, he received support, but this does not mean that he will have these 5%. This is a protest electorate, and they did not want to vote [for Kılıçdaroğlu] but wanted another opposition candidate. These people are also tired of Erdogan, but they voted for Ogan not because they share his views on foreign and domestic policy. Muharrem Ince, who had previously withdrawn, could mobilize the protest electorate.
People who are dissatisfied not only with Erdogan, but also with Kılıçdaroğlu, voted for Ogan. In my opinion, it is easier for Erdogan to negotiate with Ogan so that his votes are counted in his direction. On one of the broadcasts, Ogan himself said before the first round that he was ready to bargain with both candidates if there was a second round. He is looking for some post, and Erdogan can offer him more opportunities. Plus, Ogan is a typical pragmatic nationalist who criticized the opposition bloc rather harshly. He can change this block and join Erdogan, thus the incumbent president has more chances to “win”, because it is obvious that there were falsifications. The opposition does not have an alternative vote counting system despite the fact that they claimed to be prepared. At the same time, Erdogan has a huge administrative, financial and media resource in order to stay in power.
Polls have shown that the protest electorate of the same Ogan and Ince can vote for Erdogan, but this does not mean that 5% of Ogan will go over to Erdogan's side. Erdogan doesn't necessarily need 5% because he already has 49%.
Why didn't Erdogan change the electoral law for his victory?
“Erdogan did not pass the bill on election by a simple majority due to two key points. First: in international practice, there is usually a second round if none of the candidates receives 50%, which often happens. The second point is that the ballot boxes are what the people will say. For Erdogan, democracy conditionally means the results of elections, that is, ballot boxes. He minimizes democracy, in his democracy there is no freedom of speech, human rights and pluralism, but he always refers to the ballot boxes in his speeches. This is the last element of his legitimacy that he did not want to infringe on the international arena, so he will further lower the threshold in order to be elected president. If he passed some kind of bill, and the president was elected simply by a majority, then there would be questions that Erdogan does not have popularity.”
Possible interference in the elections of the Russian Federation, relations with Russia in the event of an opposition victory:
“I don’t know whether Russia wanted to interfere in the elections in Turkey or not, we cannot prove this. At night it became known that the opposition simply does not have an alternative vote counting system. They could not even show their data on the screens and showed the data of the state agency, which is completely under the control of Erdogan. The opposition does not have such a system, which would have the opportunity to intervene.
As for Russia's accusations of intervention by Kılıçdaroglu, he is a very serious person, he should have had some evidence, but he also did not show any documents. He has a more or less normal image in Russia, he always sent positive signals to the Russian side in case he won, but after this statement about interference in the elections, his image in the Russian Federation probably worsened. If he wins, relations with Russia may not change dramatically. Turkey now does not have the luxury of imposing any sanctions against Russia, the Turkish economy is in crisis. There is no one to replace it in terms of energy, and Turkey cannot diversify the gas import route from the Russian direction to another. Even in regional dimensions, relations with Kılıçdaroglu could be more predictable, Kılıçdaroglu himself has said many times that he is ready to normalize relations with Syria and Russia, just as Russia is trying to restore relations between Damascus and Ankara. Erdogan does not want to withdraw Turkish troops from Syria, but if the opposition wins, most likely, the process of normalizing relations between Turkey and Syria may accelerate.
The Erdogan family produces drones and provides weapons to the Ukrainian side. Kılıçdaroglu does not have such an opportunity and there are no such relatives. In strategic and military-political terms, Erdogan is on the side of the Western bloc, but if Kılıçdaroglu wins, I would expect a decrease in military assistance to Turkey. There are moments that can positively influence.
If Erdogan wins, I expect a more active Turkish foreign policy in the post-Soviet space, which may annoy Moscow in the near future, but if Kılıçdaroglu wins, Turkey will focus more on domestic economic problems, the Kurdish issue, human rights and democracy issues, and so on. . In the event of Kılıçdaroglu's victory, I do not expect such adventurism in foreign policy as with Erdogan. Kılıçdaroglu is a pro-Western politician, but this is traditional for Turkey, because without this it is impossible to be a NATO member and a big exporter to the European market.
Kılıçdaroğlu is a cool and uncharismatic person, he will establish relationships at the institutional level with Russia and other countries. If, under Erdogan, relations with Russia were highly personalized, then with Kılıçdaroglu, the responsibility will fall more on the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and he will lead like Erdogan. In the medium term, if Kilichdaroglu wins, relations with Russia can be pragmatic, rational and mutually beneficial, however, the Russian side does not think so and believes that Erdogan is more profitable for it.”
Mirillas Agaev, political scientist:
Who will get the votes of the eliminated candidate?
“Now the issue of Ogan’s votes is controversial: on the one hand, he is a representative of the opposition and expresses his dissatisfaction with Erdogan, but on the other, he just recently announced the possibility of negotiating with all parties. This caused a huge protest in the opposition part of society, for which negotiations with Erdogan are impossible. Erdogan eventually reacted by pointing out that the opposition did not need Ogan's votes, and thus began to raise the discourse of pitting Ogan [against the opposition], as they did with Ince.
If Ogan starts from his political position, as he did before, then it is logical that the votes should go to the opposition, but if he tries to get some dividends, it is not entirely clear what will happen. Ogan's electorate is very homogeneous, 70% of the nationalists vote for him. Everything will depend on what position Ogan takes and what he will convey to his voters as a message.
Many expected a turnout of 90%, but it turned out to be 88%, which is normal for Turkey. Plus or minus the same turnout was in the last elections. This suggests that there is no need for a decrease in activity, but whether it is realistic to pull out more people is a moot point, because the Erdogan-Kylychdaroglu pair has already bothered a lot of people due to the fact that both have long been in power. Initially, the protest against this couple was high, so the likelihood that some new people will come to the urns that failed to do so in the first round is still low.”
Why didn't Erdogan change the electoral law for his victory?
“Erdogan stated that if necessary, this will be done in the future, and the fact that he did not do this means that there is no consolidation on this issue within the pro-Erdogan coalition. When the issue was raised back in 2021, Erdogan's main partner, the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party, Devlet Bahçeli strongly opposed the proposal. In the same year, 2022, there was a change in the electoral bill without specifying this moment. This suggests that the parties by that time could not agree. It also indicates a search for compromises between the parties and Erdogan’s unwillingness to somehow increase pressure.”
Possible interference in the elections of the Russian Federation, relations with Russia in the event of an opposition victory:
“On the part of the pro-Erdogan coalition, the elections are a political coup attempt by the West, to which the opposition tried to somehow react. These statements about Russian interference in the elections should be taken not from the point of view of foreign policy, but from the point of view of internal struggle, the need to protect votes and maintain transparency of elections, which is important for the opposition. Kılıçdaroğlu could not help reacting to this moment, the repeated recount of votes led to the fact that there were some small gaps that did not allow the opposition to come to power, gain control. I would not say that this will affect the relations between Ankara and Moscow if Kilichdaroglu is elected. Most likely, this will become a certain irritant, but it all depends on how the relationship between the two leaders will be built and what the context will be. In general, Kilicdaroglu needs to maintain relations with Moscow, and Moscow needs to maintain relations with Turkey, because it would be problematic to refuse contacts with Ankara. It is impossible to speak in advance about how Kılıçdaroğlu will act against Russia.
The nationalist segment put a lot of pressure on the society. Even the left party, which has never had anything to do with this segment, is beginning to sympathize with it. Such nationalistic attacks in the style that “we will defend the interests of the republic” and “for us, the interests of the Turkish state are more important than the interests of other states” are quite natural. Such statements are made by almost all politicians, and this does not depend on the ideological line. What is important here is that this appeal to nationalism expresses the main line, but this does not mean that all relations should be broken off. We need to look at how relations will develop, and only after that give assessments.
In addition to the first round of presidential elections, parliamentary elections were also held in Turkey, the Republican Alliance, led by Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP), won. He won 49.31% of the vote, which guarantees him 322 seats out of 600 seats in parliament. In second place is the opposition People's Alliance led by the Republican People's Party (CHP) Kılıçdaroglu (35.19%), that is, about 212 seats. The Alliance of Labor and Freedom also entered parliament with 10.52% of the vote, which includes the Green Left Party. It can count on 66 seats.
The first round of elections was not without public scandals. So, during the first round, Erdogan handed out money to children right at the polling station where he came to vote. In addition, there were statements about Moscow's interference in the elections. Two days before the vote, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu accused Russia of editing videos that discredit candidates and using content made using Deep Fake technology. The statement came after Erdogan showed a video of Kılıçdaroğlu in a speech to supporters, showing the leader of the Kurdish militants.
Also, a few days before the first round, the candidate Muharrem Ince (Fatherland Party) suddenly withdrew from the election, explaining that he was doing this because of the publication of a fake sexual photograph. According to Ince, he has been harassed for the past 45 days. He called all the photos and other materials published with him fakes made to prevent him from winning the vote.
Erdogan, in turn, accused the United States of interfering in the elections and recalled that in January 2020, during his campaign, Joe Biden said that Washington should encourage Erdogan's opponents. However, in the same speech, Biden clarified that Erdogan should not be overthrown in a coup.