UAF drone attacks on civilian targets in Russia are a mirror image of Russia's current approach to warfare, but on a much smaller scale. With these attacks, Kyiv demonstrated to the Russians that their vaunted air defenses could not protect them. In addition, this is a message to the Putin regime: "We are going on the offensive."
This is part of the very large-scale campaign that is commonly called the "counteroffensive" – Ukraine's summer operation to liberate its territories. UAV attacks, along with the invasion of the Belgorod region by various armed formations , consisting of Russians, who are clearly sponsored by Ukraine, affect the information and military space and facilitate the offensive by diverting Russian forces. Here and there, statements about a “tough response” from the Putin regime flicker. But does he have the ability to do so? There are few, if any left. In addition, the decision to supply Ukraine with efficient modern fighters is a turning point in the military balance of power.
The Kremlin has few, if any, options to “strike back”
Earth – air – water: Russia's forces are running out
Let's start with ground operations: the capture of Bakhmut is a classic example of a Pyrrhic victory. This relatively insignificant town cost Russia tens of thousands of soldiers and required huge resources over the course of eight months. In a broader sense, the armored forces of the Russian Armed Forces are virtually destroyed: according to the Oryx OSINT project, Russia has lost more than 2,000 tanks, that is, about half of the number available at the beginning of the conflict. <As The Insider previously reported , the Russians are now forced to use stocks of armored vehicles from the 1960s.> The biggest source of tanks for the Armed Forces is trophies captured from the Russian army. Russia does not produce armored vehicles in the required volume to make up for the losses incurred. Efforts to recruit and train personnel have also largely failed . This will lead to the fact that in the foreseeable future, the Russian ground forces will run out of opportunities for offensive operations.
In terms of airspace, Russia regularly fires dozens of missiles into Ukraine. About 90% of them are shot down by Ukrainian air defense . Take the Patriot air defense system, which shot down the sensational Kinzhal hypersonic missile. At the same time, Russian deliveries of precision guided missiles are apparently declining, and Russia is now using newly produced missiles . But Ukraine is also running out of ammunition for the Soviet-made air defense systems Buk and S-300 . It is likely that the purpose of frequent attacks on Kyiv is to deplete Ukrainian stocks of air defense missiles. But given that the West is supplying the Armed Forces of Ukraine with modern equipment, this plan is unlikely to succeed. Over the next year, Ukraine will fully switch to Western systems, such as the successful IRIS-T , NASAMS and, of course, the " Kinzhal " killer – Patriot.
Can Russia rely on aviation to achieve its goals? With the exception of being used as launch platforms for the aforementioned missiles aimed at civilian targets, the Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) have played a relatively small role in the conflict over the past year. The same is true for the Ukrainian Air Force and for the same reason. According to aviation experts, the powerful ground-based air defense systems of both sides led to a "mutual denial" (mutual denial) of air battles.
In other words, neither side can safely deploy aircraft to support ground forces. It is unacceptable for NATO to conduct any type of ground operations without first establishing control over the air by destroying enemy air defenses. Russia had a chance to achieve this in the first week of the war, but it did not take advantage of it, and now it is too late, since the Aerospace Forces are not capable of conducting complex operations of "suppression of enemy air defense" (Suppression of Enemy Air Defense, or SEAD) . The fact is that Russian military doctrine is not focused on air power, unlike NATO. In fairness, it should be noted that without the help of the United States , the European Air Force would not have been able to achieve air superiority either. However, this does not matter, because they still have the support of the US Air Force.
According to reliable estimates , the effectiveness and potential of the VCS is still high , despite the losses incurred (about 10% of the fleet). However, the command of the Aerospace Forces is striving to ensure the preservation of air defense capabilities and strike potential in case NATO enters the war.
All this led to the use of artillery-oriented tactics in the Russian war against Ukraine, which was last used during the First World War. When air strikes are unavailable due to effective ground defenses, artillery is the only way to strike the enemy from a distance. The acquisition by Ukraine of long-range high-precision artillery systems of the HIMARS type allowed the Armed Forces of Ukraine to strike at targets in the Russian rear without the use of aircraft. Russian logistics have tried to move further from the front line, which has led to even more problems, as cargo now has to make its way along the ground under Ukrainian rocket fire.
The third traditional area of warfare – maritime – although important, is not decisive in this conflict. Russia, of course, may try to completely cut off grain supplies from Ukraine, but in this case the West will compensate it for any losses.
Does Russia have trump cards that it could use to retaliate? In short, no. Russia has no options for escalation against Ukraine in the three main operational areas of military operations. Assumptions that some "new" weapons systems, such as the well-known but practically useless Armata tank or rare Su-57 fighters , can save the day are erroneous. Even if they were produced in large numbers, they would not be able to change the situation at the front.
Russia has no options for escalation against Ukraine in three warspaces
On the Western Front without prospects
There is also an option for Russia to act against Ukraine's western allies – for example, the Russians already tried to shoot down a British reconnaissance aircraft last October, but it is not clear if the attack was authorized by the top leadership. Fortunately, the attempt failed. It is reasonable to assume that warnings were issued after that that any similar episodes would be considered an act of aggression and lead to devastating consequences. While Russian air defenses are strong in principle, they do not have an adequate response to the effective F-35 stealth aircraft that underpin most of NATO's large air forces. Western aviation analysts practically agree that in the fight against NATO , the Russian Aerospace Forces and their air defense as a whole will be destroyed. The prospect of such a conflict, of course, gives rise to an entirely new conversation related to nuclear threats and the possible use of nuclear weapons.
The situation with Russia's "conventional" military is likely to only get worse if Kyiv's upcoming offensive does not end in catastrophic failure. The turning point was the US announcement of the withdrawal of objections to the supply of F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine . By themselves, they are unlikely to turn the tide of the war – there will be too few of them to significantly change the overall situation. They will face the same problems as the VKS fighters. Moreover, the Ukrainian MiG-29s will be forced to confront the enemy's effective and currently not suppressed air defense system. They will complement the air defense of Ukraine, but will change little on the battlefield. The fighters themselves are not important – what matters is their symbolic meaning. It is larger than that of tanks or rocket-artillery systems, the F-16 is a sign of visible long-term and high-tech support for the Ukrainian defense from the West and the United States. Ukrainian aviation is being revived and, with the help of NATO, will have a decisive influence on the overall balance of power in the medium term (from 2 to 5 years).