Russian defensive lines
One of the most discussed issues regarding the raids in the Belgorod region of the "Russian" armed groups fighting on the side of Ukraine – the "Russian Volunteer Corps" (RDK) and the "Legion Freedom of Russia" (LSR) – concerns how their fighters have already succeeded several times overcome the defensive line built in the region, known as the “notch line”.
Previously, RDK sabotage groups successfully penetrated the Bryansk region, where the authorities also erected “strongholds of the defense line” and proudly showed them to the General Secretary of the United Russia party, First Deputy Chairman of the Federation Council Andrei Turchak, who arrived with an inspection. The politician, in particular, said then:
The experience of the Bryansk region without exaggeration can be called advanced. In an extremely short time, they strengthened the border – the mouse will not slip through.
And just a few weeks later, RDK fighters entered the border villages of Sushany and Lyubechany, filmed a propaganda video there, and safely returned to the territory of Ukraine.
Defensive lines are being built along the entire "old" Russian-Ukrainian border and beyond. Recently, the imagination of the war-watching public has been struck by satellite images of the defenses that the Russians are building in the occupied territories of Ukraine. In particular, we are talking about a continuous trench 70 kilometers long from the outskirts of Melitopol to the village of Marinovka in the Primorsk region on the shores of the Sea of Azov. The trenches dug right on the Black Sea coast in Crimea, and the lines of concrete barriers inside the peninsula are striking in their scale (and not only in scale). For example, in the village of Vitino, trenches and rows of anti-tank concrete "pyramids" (aka "dragon's teeth") are located literally on the beach. The same "pyramids" were installed in several rows on the Ak-Monai Isthmus, which connects the Kerch Peninsula with the rest of Crimea.
In general, according to British military intelligence, since the summer of 2022, Russia has built one of the largest fortification systems in the world in recent decades (most likely since the Second World War). They are located not only on the front line, but also in the rear, as well as along the "old" Russian-Ukrainian border. The unprecedented efforts spent on creating long-term defensive lines, their geographical location and type of arrangement, reveal a lot about the strategy of the Russian command and the system of priorities in the current war against Ukraine.
Since the summer of 2022, Russia has built one of the largest fortification systems in the world
Some of these lines, as in the Bryansk and Belgorod regions, as far as one can judge, turned out to be completely useless, being, probably, "cut" undertakings of local administrations. Defensive structures in the Crimea and the Lugansk region have a certain military meaning, but in an extremely distant future. And only echeloned, well-prepared and engineered positions in the Kherson and Zaporozhye regions are a really serious challenge for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
What and how the Russians are building
If you look at the efforts of the Russian side in a broad context, you get a rather contradictory picture. On the one hand, what is definitely the largest fortification project in Europe over the past 70 years has been implemented. An extended system of engineering structures has been built, in some areas consisting of several lines and taking into account the geographical features of the area, about 1 thousand km long on an area of about 100 thousand km².
The most extensive network of fortifications was created in the south of the Zaporozhye region and is designed to protect the "land bridge" to the Crimea.
A typical strip of Russian engineering defenses in the area includes:
- anti-tank ditches;
- dug "zigzag" trenches;
- concrete gouges (“dragon teeth”);
- metal anti-tank hedgehogs;
- barbed wire fences;
- mine fields.
At a distance from the line of contact on the territory of the Zaporizhzhya region controlled by Russian forces, the fortifications, as it were, encircle the largest cities.
Pasi Paroinen, an OSINT analyst , published a detailed analysis of one of the sectors (Kopani – Rabotino – Tokmak), where Ukrainian forces are currently conducting a counteroffensive. On satellite images, he showed how the system of fortifications and fortified areas was organized. The Russians built an echeloned defense with a total depth of about 30 km almost to Tokmak, and the city itself was prepared for all-round defense. Analyst Rob Lee notes that the purpose of such fortifications is not to create an impenetrable defense, but to prevent Ukrainian forces from converting a tactical breakthrough into a strategic one and give the Russians time to move reinforcements.
An equally extensive network of defensive lines was created in the Kherson region, where it was named the “Surovikin Line” in honor of the former commander (and now deputy commander) of the Russian group in Ukraine Sergey Surovikin. Defensive lines were built along natural boundaries and key routes. In general, Western analysts note that the engineering troops of the Russian Federation are generally coping with their duties.
On the other hand, some of the constructed lines are clearly demonstrative (if not imitative) in nature. First of all, these are the Wagner line in the Lugansk region, the Aksenov line in the Crimea, and the "notch lines" in the Kursk, Bryansk and Belgorod regions. In the rear areas of the Lugansk region, huge lines of anti-tank concrete gouges have been built near the cities of Popasnaya, Lisichansk and Severodonetsk. As far as one can judge, they were erected by the forces of the Wagner PMC, and not by the engineering troops, which is why they were dubbed the Wagner line in the media. In the north of the Lugansk region, the defensive line runs along the Svatovo-Kremennaya line almost to the old Russian-Ukrainian border.
Some of the constructed lines are clearly imitation
In the north of the Crimean peninsula, in its narrowest part, less sophisticated and well-thought-out lines were built from trenches and anti-tank ditches. The “head” of Crimea, Sergey Aksyonov, said in mid-March 2023 that the fortification lines did not leave the Armed Forces of Ukraine any chance of “de-occupying” the peninsula. A month earlier, Aksyonov was going to "lead excursions" along the defensive lines if they were not needed.
Finally, certain efforts to strengthen the defensive lines are being made by Belarus (Russia's de facto ally in the war with Ukraine). In particular, satellite photographs of the construction of a fortified area in the Gomel region, which was called the Khrenin line (after the Minister of Defense Viktor Khrenin), appeared .
A separate conversation is about the construction of defensive structures in the Bryansk, Kursk and Belgorod regions. The most revealing story happened with the Belgorod "notch line".
Back in October 2022, the following news appeared in the media:
The governor of the Belgorod region Vyacheslav Gladkov said that the authorities of the region are installing protective structures. Concrete blocks of a pyramidal shape were placed in two rows in an open field. As a rule, they are used as anti-tank barriers.
True, then they so pathetically described the arrangement of rows of concrete pyramids in an open field, they are also “dragon's teeth”, or “Wagner's teeth”, as they are called in the Belgorod region. A defense line made in this way cannot serve as any serious obstacle to tanks and even heavy infantry fighting vehicles or armored personnel carriers. As some Russian military experts noted at the same time, those deployed in the ranks of the “pyramid” will at best stop (and even then not for long) a pickup truck with a sabotage and reconnaissance group.
In addition, the "notch line" was originally built not on the very border with Ukraine, but at some distance: therefore, for example, the participants of the RDK entered Novaya Tavolzhanka or the villages of the Graivoronsky district completely unhindered. Governor Vyacheslav Gladkov admitted that the main purpose of the defense structures, oddly enough, is not to protect the inhabitants, but to “sober up our enemies” – accordingly, many settlements remained in front (and not behind) of an already rather conditional line of defense.
According to the Russian authorities, the main purpose of the protective structures is not to protect residents, but to “sober up enemies”
According to the rules, it was required to lay out “dragon teeth” in at least six rows, connect them with cables or, ideally, put them on a concrete base, dig anti-tank ditches two meters deep and five meters wide and at such an angle that the walls did not crumble, put fields of anti-tank and anti-personnel mines, establish constant aerial surveillance with drones or establish observation posts, and maintain sufficient forces in reserve to quickly call them in when a breakthrough is attempted.
And of course, it is necessary to block roads, for example, to put heavy concrete tetrapods on them, forcing enemy vehicles to go around them through minefields. In addition, positions must be masked, which, of course, was not done. Thanks to satellite imagery, even open data researchers have compiled fairly detailed maps of Russian defensive lines ( 1 , 2 , 3 ).
The "notch line" in the Belgorod region is just a few lines of concrete pyramids and trenches. Without soldiers, artillery, control and surveillance systems, they are useless. And if you seriously equip them, saturate them with manpower and equipment, then the question immediately arises: where to get people and resources?
However, there was also criticism of Surovikin's line. In March 2023, the authors of the odious Telegram channel DSHRG "Rusich" wrote about the following shortcomings:
- The line is built according to old maps, and in some places the terrain is simply not taken into account;
- The soil from the dug anti-tank ditches is placed in multi-meter embankments, blocking the sector of shooting and observation from positions;
- Weak overlappings in dugouts in one roll of boards covered with a layer of earth;
- There are no drainage ditches and drainage pits in the trenches;
- There are no good dirt roads along the line for the access of equipment and the transportation (or evacuation) of people.
In a global sense, spending so much time and effort on creating a system of defensive fortified areas means the actual recognition of the transition to strategic defense and old-fashioned positional warfare with a stake on the depletion of enemy forces. Obviously, the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces does not expect to protect the occupied territories otherwise than relying on branched lines of fortifications. It is noteworthy that, judging by satellite images , the bulk of the work was completed after November 2022, when Russian troops left Kherson.
How much does it cost
In December 2022, Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin said at a meeting of the Coordinating Council to meet the needs of the RF Armed Forces that 34 billion rubles were allocated for subsidies to the regions bordering Ukraine. According to Mishustin, these funds were intended for "infrastructure, the creation of fortifications and their engineering equipment."
On March 31, Mishustin stated at a regular meeting of the Coordinating Council:
“It is important to continue the construction of fortifications on the line of deployment of our troops. Most of them are already fully equipped. Also, new strongholds are being built for the border service and the existing strongholds are being equipped.”
Just in March 2023, the Capital Construction Department of the Kursk Region signed two state contracts for the total amount of 3.2 billion rubles for the construction of fortifications with Kursk Region Development Corporation JSC. It is not clear what exactly and where they were going to build, since there were no terms of reference in the applications posted on the public procurement portal. As soon as journalists paid attention to the contracts, information about them was deleted . Judging by the photographs, the Kursk fortifications are a system of camouflaged firing points.
In Crimea, the Aksenov line is still more difficult. According to Sergei Aksenov, the construction of facilities in the north began on his personal initiative in the interests of the “territorial defense” of the peninsula. And, to be honest, behind the trenches dug in Evpatoria and other resort areas right on the shore, it is difficult to see anything other than the banal development of funds. In the foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the Armed Forces of Ukraine are capable of conducting any large-scale operations with the landing of amphibious assaults, and even if one imagines this, trenches right on the beach will not help to prevent the landing.
The trenches dug in Evpatoria and other resort places right on the shore are a banal development of funds
Political scientist and military expert Pavel Luzin suggested that the construction of defensive lines in the old Russian regions was primarily based on the interests of local business, and not military-strategic considerations:
The line is being built by local precast concrete and cement factories, often affiliated with regional officials who have seen their orders dwindle under wartime conditions. So everything can turn out to be another "cut" of the budget.
Reinforced concrete "pyramids" cost from 5 thousand to 16 thousand rubles apiece, depending on the brand of concrete (this is really important ), size and other parameters. Delivery costs extra money: for example, delivery to the Bryansk region was estimated at 5 thousand rubles apiece, while the cost of the “pyramid” itself was 7–8 thousand rubles.
The Moscow Times published calculations that, according to all the rules, one kilometer of anti-tank barriers requires about a thousand pyramids laid in four rows. Thus, even at the minimum price of 5 thousand rubles for a concrete triangle, a kilometer will cost 5 million rubles, and this does not include transportation, installation, earthworks, other fortifications and engineering structures.
For example, during the construction of a defensive line in the Bryansk region, an additional 12,000 m³ of lumber was required , which were allocated free of charge by local timber enterprises.
In the Belgorod region, they began to build a defensive line as part of the Wagner line, but later the local authorities intercepted the project, renamed it the “notch line” so as not to share funding with Prigozhin’s structures, and mastered 10 billion rubles on it – it was reported that 4.2 thousand people and 680 pieces of equipment were involved in the work at a time.
Apparently, at least in some places, especially in the rear areas, defensive lines are being built formally, "for show". The Russian service of the BBC wrote that in the Lugansk region they ordered “pyramids” made of less durable types of concrete and simply dumped them in a heap in the field, although due to risks, the cost of transportation still turned out to be quite impressive: 15–20 thousand rubles apiece . With such a cost, it is not surprising that even Z-figures like Igor Girkin (aka Strelkov / Runov) call the Surovikin line the Faberge line because of the high cost of execution.
Will the defense lines help repel the offensive of the Armed Forces of Ukraine
As historical experience shows (more on this below), no lines of defense are capable of providing reliable protection on their own. However, some experts believe that the extensive fortification work means that the Russian command has successfully adapted to defensive tasks. We can agree with this: fortified areas and echeloned obstacle courses show the level of long-term planning.
At the same time, the Russians will need a huge amount of resources to maintain all these trenches, concrete barriers, strong points, dugouts in order, place reserves there, establish communications and control, and so on. It is unlikely that all these forces and means were originally planned.
It takes at least 100-120 military personnel just to keep one kilometer of an engineered defensive line under steady control, not counting drone operators, gunners, support units, and so on. Thus, in order to reliably cover only the border of the Kursk and Belgorod regions with Ukraine, 80-95 thousand people are needed .
Нельзя исключать, что изначальный смысл грандиозного строительства заключался в том, чтобы послать ясный политический сигнал и украинской стороне, и заинтересованным политическим и экономическим акторам в России и на Западе, а также показать решимость во что бы то ни стало защищать территории, которые сейчас контролируют российские войска.
Вероятно, построенные по всем правилам военной науки оборонительные линии в Запорожской и Херсонской областях серьезно замедлят продвижение ВСУ и дадут время на то, чтобы подтянуть резервы и организовать отпор. В худшем случае, без должного обеспечения личным состав и техникой, а также отработки действий при отражении наступления противника, они не смогут выполнить и этой функции.
Что касается приграничных Брянской, Белгородской и Курской областей, то потраченные там деньги и вовсе выглядят выброшенными на ветер. «Засечная черта» там нигде не образует сплошных линий обороны, а сами укрепления до сих пор занимают даже не пограничные силы, а обычные срочники, причем их снабжение отдано на откуп волонтерам. Гораздо эффективнее было бы организовать отселение жителей из районов в радиусе действия украинской артиллерии и заодно разместить там высокомобильные силы быстрого реагирования, оснащенные техническими средствами контроля за границей.
История неудач: от Великой Китайской стены до линии Макнамары
История военного дела знает великое множество примеров масштабных оборонительных сооружений. Самый известный из них, разумеется, — Великая Китайская стена, протянувшаяся на многие тысячи километров и строившаяся в течение почти 2,5 тысячи лет. Как известно, циклопическая защитная стена не слишком удачно справлялась с непосредственной задачей: кочевники с севера регулярно завоевывали Китай.
Схожим образом обстояло дело и с римскими заградительными валами. Знаменитые Адрианов и Антонинов валы на острове Британия (вдохновившие писателя Джорджа Мартина на образ Стены в эпопее «Песнь льда и пламени», художественной основе сериала «Игра престолов») худо-бедно справлялись с крупными набегами северных «варваров», но никогда не были по-настоящему непроницаемыми. Тем не менее, земляные насыпи и системы стен с крепостями превратились в «золотой стандарт» укрепления границ.
Несмотря на то, что насыпи и системы стен не были непроницаемыми, они превратились в «золотой стандарт» укрепления границ
Сплошные линии укреплений из бетонных сооружений с пулеметными гнездами, подземными тоннелями, артиллерийскими позициями, полосами колючей проволоки, минными заграждениями и лабиринтами окопов появились в первой половине XX века. Во время Первой мировой войны немцы построили впечатляющую линию Гинденбурга (названную в честь фельдмаршала Пауля фон Гинденбурга), использовав 500 тысяч тонн камня и щебня, 100 тысяч тонн цемента и 12,5 тысячи тонн колючей проволоки. В сентябре 1918 года союзным войскам потребовалось всего несколько дней, чтобы после интенсивной артиллерийской подготовки с опорой на только-только появившиеся на фронте в значительном количестве танки прорвать оборонительный рубеж.
В межвоенный период в большинстве стран Европы строили собственные оборонительные линии (некоторые исследователи называют этот период не иначе как «фортификационная лихорадка»), и ни одна из них по большому счету не сыграла какой-либо существенной роли в период боевых действий.
К исключениям обычно относят советско-финляндскую войну, которая прочно ассоциируется с так называемой линией Маннергейма (по имени фельдмаршала Карла Густава Маннергейма). Советская пропаганда связывала неудачное наступление зимой 1939–1940 годов именно с системой фортификационных укреплений в финской части Карельского перешейка. Но как мы знаем сегодня, никакой линии в виде непрерывной цепочки долговременных сооружений там никогда не существовало, техническое исполнение имевшихся сооружений оставляло желать лучшего , а главные трудности РККА объяснялись более прозаическими причинами.
В самом СССР с конца 1920-х годов строили линию Сталина. В 1940–1941 годах к ней добавили линию Молотова. Обе линии представляли собой системы укреплений из ДОТов, бетонных бункеров и оборудованных артиллерийских позиций. Линия Молотова располагалась вдоль новой границы СССР с Германией (после раздела Польши в 1939 году), а линия Сталина — вдоль старой границы. Считается, что нападение Гитлера в 1941 году застало линию Молотова незаконченной, а линию Сталина — частично заброшенной. Так или иначе, самое большее, на что их хватило, — на несколько месяцев задержать продвижение немцев к Москве.
Примерно так же проявила себя французская линия Мажино (по имени военного министра Андре Мажино). Проект длился 10 лет и потребовал извлечения 12 млн м³ земли, заливки 1,5 млн м³ цемента, поставки 150 тысяч тонн стали и обошелся почти в $4 млрд (в переводе на современные деньги). В 1940 году гитлеровской армии хватило всего шесть недель, чтобы разгромить и оккупировать Францию. «Чудо военной инженерной мысли», как называли линию Мажино, не сумело остановить немцев, хотя и вынудило германское командование пойти на довольно рискованные шаги .
Правда, потом сами немцы наступили на те же грабли. Они вложили колоссальные средства и людские ресурсы в строительство сначала Атлантического вала на европейском побережье, а потом линии Зигфрида на западе Германии и линии Густава на юге Италии. Все эти укрепления не помешали союзникам провести успешные десантные операции, а потом победоносно наступать.
Некоторые оборонительные линии оказались настолько бесполезными, что даже штурмовать их не потребовалось. Итальянский диктатор Бенито Муссолини почти 20 лет строил так называемый Альпийский вал на северных границах страны, как раз в регионе Альп, протяженностью без малого 2 тысячи км. Система горных укрепрайонов Муссолини не пригодилась.
В качестве ответа на итальянский Альпийский вал в Югославии в конце 1930-х соорудили линию Рупника (по имени генерала Леона Рупника). Полностью завершить линию планировалось аж в 1947 году, поэтому когда немецкая группировка начала вторжение, никакой обороны не вышло. Фортификационные сооружения впоследствии разрушили, чтобы извлечь ценные металлы. После Второй мировой характер войн изменился, но оборонительные линии по-прежнему неизменно доказывали свою бесполезность.
Оборонительные линии неизменно доказывали свою бесполезность и после Второй мировой войны
Американцы в разгар войны во Вьетнаме намеревались закрыть для повстанцев «тропу Хо Ши Мина» при помощи высокотехнологичной заградительной линии Макнамары (по имени министра обороны Роберта Макнамары). Разработанный в 1966 году проект был основан на массовом применении электронных датчиков, патрульной авиации, воздушном минировании и ударах «умными боеприпасами», его стоимость оценивалась в $1 млрд в год. В том числе из-за дороговизны линию Макнамары так и не реализовали в том виде, в каком задумывали. В 1969 году задумку признали неудачной, а в 1973 году США вывели войска из Вьетнама.
Израильтяне в 1968–1969 годах построили линию укреплений, известную как линия Бар-Лева (по имени начальника Генштаба ЦАХАЛ Хаима Бар-Лева), вдоль восточного берега Суэцкого канала длиной 160 км, потратив в общей сложности $300 млн. В Израиле полагали, что египетской армии потребуется не меньше нескольких суток, чтобы прорвать укрепления. Когда же египтяне в 1973 году начали войну, им хватило всего нескольких часов, чтобы разрушить песчаные заграждения потоками воды из насосов.
Примеры можно продолжать, но общий вывод таков: статичные линии обороны, сколько бы денег, времени и сил на них ни потратили, неизбежно будут преодолены при достаточно мощном ударе или определенной доле изобретательности со стороны противника.