Following the release of the Safeguard Defenders report on the existence of overseas police stations, or so-called "overseas service stations", investigations were initiated in 14 countries, including Europe, the US, Canada, Chile and Nigeria. The main reason for this was, of course, not so much the violation of the rights of Chinese citizens who were forcibly returned to their homeland, but the very fact of the presence on the territories of other sovereign states of “police stations”, with the help of which the Chinese authorities extend their executive power beyond their own borders. Most of the victims avoid talking to the press, but The Insider was able to talk to one of the victims, oppositionist Wang Jinyu, who was persecuted by the Chinese government abroad.
Wang Jinyu's Odyssey
Wang's story began back in 2019. He grew up in a politically active and deeply opposed family: despite the fact that his father was a military pilot, they never had national television at home, and his parents preferred to watch reports from CNN or the BBC. Because of this, while still in high school, Wang got into trouble with the police. He was summoned to the station several times for making anti-government remarks or posting on Weibo, a major Chinese social network.
“I had a Weibo account with 3,000 followers, not that many. In 2019, I read a propaganda article that said that if you come from China to Hong Kong and speak Mandarin, the Hong Kong people will attack you – just like that. This is, of course, an absolute lie. No one in Hong Kong will attack someone for no reason. I just said it wasn't true and said I support Hong Kong democracy. Almost immediately, the police came to my school, they arrested me on the spot and sent me into custody for two days – then I was only 17 years old.
Wang was able to be released thanks to the help of his father and decided that he needed to leave the country. Already in 2019, Wang Jinyu relocated to Istanbul in the hope that he would be safe there, but he was mistaken.
“I thought that if I was not in China, the Chinese police would not be able to do anything to me. Unfortunately, I was wrong. In 2021, I faced threats again. I posted something about the war between China and India, and how the Chinese government always releases fake news, and that we Chinese do not want and should not live in such a false country.”
Wang's post went viral and caught the attention of the Chinese government, as he and his family were publicly denounced on television and threatened.
“I don’t know why they were so angry about it. My face was constantly glowing on TV. It seems to me that now almost all Chinese people know me. On February 22, 2021, a Chinese Foreign Ministry official stated that the police would arrest me even if I was in America or Europe. At that time, I did not believe in it – it seemed to me that if I got to Europe or the USA, any democratic country, the Chinese government would not get me. I decided to leave Turkey and bought a ticket to New York on an Emirates Airlines flight on April 5th.”
Van had to get to New York with a three-hour layover in Dubai. But he was not destined to get on the second side. At the Dubai airport, Wang was detained by local police and placed in a temporary detention center without explanation.
“It was crazy. I was jailed for almost two months. Lawyers did not come to me, only representatives of the PRC – the ambassador to the UAE and the consul general in Dubai. Every time they brought some documents in Arabic, they said that if I signed them, they would release me, give me first-class tickets back to Guangzhou, there I would publicly apologize to my fellow citizens, and everything would be fine.”
Wang was threatened that if he refused to sign the documents, he could face up to 10 years in prison, because he was accused of spreading hatred against Islam (there is a law in the UAE prohibiting blasphemy, for which he faces up to five years in prison). Wang himself still does not know what exactly served as at least a formal reason for the accusations.
“I have never spoken out against Muslims… The only thing I have ever spoken about is support for the rights of the Uyghurs in China, so the allegations are completely absurd.”
Despite a long detention pending a court hearing and rather serious charges, the UAE court turned out to be on the side of Wang: the case was closed for lack of corpus delicti, and the young man was released in the courtroom. However, upon leaving, he was again arrested – this time for "illegal border crossing."
“I really didn’t get a visa, because I didn’t plan to leave the airport – the police took me out of there. It was completely crazy – I was just going to make a transplant, but I was arrested, taken from the airport, and then I was charged for the same. Absurd!"
Wang and human rights activists working with him are convinced that both the first and second arrests were made by local police at the suggestion or pressure of Chinese diplomats. The guards in the detention center also seemed to be of the same opinion: they gave Wang his phone and allowed him to use it, as a result he was able to contact his girlfriend and regularly post about his situation on Twitter.
Wang managed to attract the attention of journalists, major publications and human rights activists such as AP, Deutsche Welle and Safeguard Defenders. A few weeks later, the US State Department demanded that the UAE release Wang, and on May 27, 2021, he was released without explanation. However, he could not get to the USA – the police insisted on deportation back to Istanbul. From there, Wang planned to move to a safer country – but again ran into an obstacle.
“After returning to Turkey, I settled in Hyatt. On May 28, on the second day of my stay in Istanbul, I went out to the restaurant at the hotel to eat and after that I could not find my passport. I called the Turkish police; they reacted quickly enough, arrived and checked the cameras. According to the recording, as soon as I left my room, the maids came in – according to the hotel, they brought me water. But I still don't believe it – I never left the hotel, where could my passport go?
The police could not help with anything else – Wang allegedly did not have any evidence that the passport was indeed stolen. From that moment on, the search came to a standstill, until the press intervened again.
“I was lucky to be helped by the WSJ, the American media. They sent an email to the Hyatt Group – it's an American network, with American management. They asked them about this situation, and in return they promised to contact me to solve the problem. And indeed, a few hours later, the general manager of my hotel called me and said that he could return my passport. But he clarified that my passport was not at the hotel – it was “very far away”. He didn't say exactly where or why, but I'm guessing he was at the Chinese embassy in Ankara. And I just waited almost two weeks for my passport to be returned to me.”
“The manager of my hotel replied that my passport is already very far away”
As a result, the hotel management did return the passport, and immediately after that, Wang left Turkey in a hurry, and the first country he was able to go to, despite the covid restrictions, was Ukraine. He could not stay there for a long time: soon he received a letter from the Chongqing police, in which he was "warned" about the start of the extradition process. In a panic, Van was forced to seek asylum – and was able to find him in the Netherlands.
“I thought that in the Netherlands I would be completely safe. But I was wrong again. The Chinese police called me all the time, more than a thousand times, I think. At the same time, they called me from the official number 110, which they also use in China. They said they wanted to talk to me. They asked me to think about my parents, about the family over which they have power. When I first reported this to the Dutch police, they told me it was illegal, of course, but they couldn't do anything because it wasn't the Dutch police who threatened me."
Wang mentioned a specific number for a reason – in addition to being used by the police inside China, it is also associated with "foreign police stations", and quite openly – we will analyze this in more detail a little later. Thus, the 110 call was the first time in Wang's case that China's "overseas police station" had come into direct contact with China – if they were involved in Wang's detention in Dubai or the passport theft in Istanbul, there is no evidence of this.
The Chinese security forces did not stop at threats to the family and calls to “think their heads”.
“On June 9, 2022, I received a message from an unknown number that a Chinese special agent based in Germany was supposed to come to the Netherlands to kill me. Of course, I didn’t believe it, but just in case, I called the Dutch police and said that I was threatened with murder.”
A few days later, a stranger called at the door and began to threaten to kill me in Chinese.
“I asked him why he wants to kill me. He said that because of my protests outside the Chinese embassy. I immediately called the police, and he ran away – as it turned out later, he flew to Germany. A few days later, when I was at the police station, they called me again with threats. I immediately said that I was at the police station, and the man who called said that he wanted to talk to representatives of the law. The policeman demanded that he introduce himself – and this guy literally in a couple of minutes sent me a video with a passport and a ticket from Germany to the Netherlands. As a result, the police sent me to a hotel for three months under the witness protection program until he was arrested.”
“I asked him why he wants to kill me. He said it was because of my protests outside the Chinese embassy.”
As a result, the person who threatened Wang was indeed detained in The Hague – it later turned out that he was an employee of the "foreign police", in which, as he himself claimed, "there is nothing illegal." He planned to "arrest" Wang. It was possible to catch the suspect with the help of Wang himself, who volunteered to meet with an employee of the “foreign police” in a cafe, where he was detained by his Dutch colleagues.
“After that, the Chinese authorities changed the plan. They began to send "denunciations" to the police – supposedly I have a bomb, I have a gun, drugs, whatever. They just call or write to the Dutch police and say that I want to kill someone. The police came to my house more than once – they even detained me several times for a couple of hours. It's okay, in general, because now they already recognize me; and they always let me go with an apology.”
After that, the Dutch police ignored calls from "volunteers" from "foreign police stations" accusing Wang of crimes for some time. Until the Chinese embassy intervened, they officially called the police and accused Wang of attempted murder and mining the Chinese embassy in The Hague.
“I was again detained by the Dutch police. But I was treated very well – they knew I didn’t do anything, but they had to make sure.”
Since then, the persecution has somewhat changed form and significantly increased in scale – in the name of Wang, hotels in all EU countries were massively booked, and then bomb-threats and ransom demands were sent out on his behalf. Wang believes that the hotel reservations were necessary to increase the "realism" of the threat – not the Chinese "cops" themselves contacted the police, but hotel employees. In some cases, this led to temporary arrests of Wang.
Moreover, threats to the family have become more frequent – the parents of the young man were arrested in September 2021, and since then the Chinese government has used them as leverage against him.
“I received an email from the official address of the Chinese police. They said that if I wanted to help my friends and family, I should return to China. They said that my parents were waiting for me. In response, the human rights activists and I demanded permission to speak to them, but instead they sent me a recording of my father's voice. He said that I was a traitor, that the government of the Netherlands was unjust and treacherous.”
All this time, even more petty pressure on Wang continues. Dozens of couriers with unpaid orders are ordered to his address (apparently, again, employees of the "stations") every day, dozens of couriers with unpaid orders are ordered, calls continue with threats of mining, and Van himself is called: “To be honest, I don’t know how you can live like this. They recently told the Dutch police that ISIS fighters were hiding in my apartment. Even studying or working is impossible.”
“Every day, they send dozens of couriers with unpaid orders to Wang’s address.”
Wang's story is one of many and yet unique. In most cases, if Chinese citizens manage to avoid deportation, they prefer to remain anonymous – for various reasons, including to hide from the "police stations". Wang, despite the fact that he is aware of all the risks for himself and his family, actively publicizes the arbitrariness of the Chinese authorities.
How did China's "foreign police stations" come about?
The “foreign police stations” themselves, while a rare and very prominent precedent, remain part of a larger and rather long-standing trend in Chinese foreign policy—the development and expansion of extraterritoriality. The development of a legislative framework for powers beyond borders has been carried out in China since the early 2000s – firstly, as a countermeasure against similar concepts in Western countries, primarily in the United States; secondly, as a tool to strengthen or justify the status of a global power.
Active actions in this direction began in 2021, along with the adoption of an anti-sanction package of laws. Pro-government Chinese sources presented it as a "safety" project aimed at protecting the "rights and dignity" of China. First of all, AFSL (anti-foreign sanctions law) really performs a protective function and is comparable in this to a similar anti-sanction law in Russia: it prohibits both Chinese and international actors in any way to contribute to the implementation of international sanctions against China. At the same time, the law gives the Chinese authorities the opportunity to introduce "countermeasures" both against companies involved in the sanctions and against individuals and their families.
The next step in this direction turned out to be much more significant: on September 2, 2022, China passed a law according to which 210,000 Chinese citizens will be returned in the future – the Law on Combating Telecommunications and Internet Fraud (ATOFL – Anti-Telecom and Online Fraud Law). The text of this law with a harmless title hides a frankly ominous implication: "The law should be applied in the fight against telecommunications and Internet fraud both in China and outside it, if it was committed by Chinese citizens." Thus, any Chinese citizen, regardless of place of residence, can be prosecuted by the Chinese authorities – just an accusation of "Internet fraud" is enough.
Any Chinese citizen, regardless of place of residence, can be prosecuted by the Chinese authorities
By the time the law came into force on December 1, 2022, a suitable system already existed in the form of “overseas service stations”. Apparently, they began to be created, or at least prepare for the opening, some time before the adoption of the ATOFL. In January 2022, the Chinese media began to actively disseminate information about the use of the number "110" – the telephone code for calling the police in China – for citizens abroad. The online publication America Chinese Life, for example, published an article on January 10, 2022, in which it said that the police of Fuzhou Province (one of the largest sources of emigration, especially for the United States ) created a call center for Chinese citizens living abroad (huaqiao) , available at number 110. The center promised to provide services 24/7; but the nature of the services and the reasons why emigrants from China are advised to contact the Chinese police were not specified.
In February, the state resource China Peace published a much longer article about the international number 110. “Use the status of huaqiao correctly!” the title was inviting. The article told several stories of Chinese expatriates who contacted 110 and how Chinese overseas police helped them. In one case, a Chinese student in Canada allegedly asked for help after suffering from a scam – of course, the police helped him return the money and arrested the perpetrator, this time in China. In the second case, police officers allegedly helped an elderly immigrant in the United States solve a problem with her bank card – they escorted her to a local bank and helped her explain herself to employees. And the Australian Department of Overseas Police helped a citizen with obtaining a certificate of no criminal record.
Apparently, the functions of the "foreign sites" included quite harmless activities – help with documents, solving problems with banks, renewing a driver's license. At the same time, the same article cites the unequivocal words of the head of the Security Bureau, Li Lianghan: "Our duty and mission is to pursue criminals." Очевидно, что несмотря на дружелюбный тон рекламных статей о «зарубежных полицейских участках», они не ограничиваются социальной работой и поддержкой — и выполняют традиционные функции полиции: разыскивают и арестовывают граждан, следят за соблюдением внутрикитайских законов и иногда расследуют мелкие преступления.
Принуждение к возвращению
Еще до расширения полномочий исполнительной власти Китая за рубежом стало известно о некоторых, хоть и нечастых пока случаях «побуждения к возвращению». Одну из таких историй, рассказанную самой полицией Китая, приводят исследователи Safeguard Defender в своем докладе. В апреле 2011 года полицейский участок в Янся — что как раз при Фуцзяне, в Фучжоу — принял звонок от бизнесмена из Мозамбика, который пожаловался, что один из его сотрудников украл большую сумму денег и сбежал обратно в Китай. Подозреваемый был вскоре задержан и рассказал полиции о своем соучастнике, оставшемся в Мозамбике. Согласно докладу, «местная» полиция — сотрудники полицейского участка в Мозамбике — быстро выяснили личность подозреваемого, связались с его семьей в Китае и с ним самим — и в итоге «убедили» его вернуться на родину и сдаться.
Еще до расширения полномочий исполнительной власти Китая, за рубежом были случаи «побуждения к возвращению»
Следующий резкий «взрыв» упоминаний «зарубежных полицейских участков» и номера 110 в китайских СМИ, судя по всему, был так или иначе связан с принятием закона об интернет-мошенничестве: по крайней мере, они совпали и по времени, и по тематике. Например, сайт издания chinanews.se, ориентированный на граждан Китая в Швеции и Норвегии, 20 сентября 2022 года — через 18 дней после принятия закона — выпустил статью c предупреждением об участившихся случаях мошенничества и рекомендовал гражданам связываться с китайской полицией по номеру 110 самостоятельно или через родственников и друзей в Китае.
Как видно, китайские власти не слишком скрывали информацию о действиях собственной полиции за рубежом и достаточно открыто публиковали информацию — хоть и исключительно на китайском. Каким же образом этим «полицейским участкам» удавалось в течение достаточно долгого времени оставаться не замеченными местными властями?
Как устроены «зарубежные полицейские участки» и их сети
Чтобы узнать чуть больше деталей, The Insider поговорил с Симоной Фантовой — чешской китаисткой, судебной переводчицей для пражских китайцев, автором научно-популярного издания о Китае Sinopsis. Симона была первой, кому удалось узнать о существовании китайского «полицейского участка» в Праге; ее исследование вышло практически одновременно с докладом Safeguard Defenders.
Симона рассказывает, что узнала о существовании такого участка практически случайно: наткнувшись на маленькую публикацию в британском таблоиде со спекуляциями о китайской полиции в Великобритании, она решила проверить, не может ли что-то подобное оказаться правдой в Чехии. Первые же несколько поисковых запросов на китайском языке показали сразу несколько статей, похожих на описание.
«Они вообще были достаточно открыты на эту тему. Единственное, что помогает им оставаться незамеченными, — то, что они публикуют новости на китайском».
Симона особенно выделяет публикацию Prague Times — которая, впрочем, удалила все статьи о «полицейских участках» и перестала обновляться вскоре после публикации доклада Safeguard Defenders.
«Зарубежные полицейские участки» в разных городах, судя по всему, имели связи с разными отделениями в Китае, в зависимости от происхождения диаспоры: в Чехии, как отмечает Симона, большинство иммигрантов из Китая родом из Цинтяня, что в Чжэцзяне. Чжэцзян, наряду с Фуцзянем, был одной из первых провинций, участвовавших в создании «зарубежных полицейских участков»; а большинство публикаций в чешских медиа на китайском языке говорили именно о полицейском отделении Цинтяня, которое, по-видимому, и курировало работу участка в Праге. Поддержка работы центра осуществлялась при помощи «волонтеров» — людей, известных в иммигрантском сообществе. Симона говорит, что ей удалось идентифицировать главу участка в Праге: мисс Чэнь Цзиньмей, активистка родом из Цинтяня со связями с «Объединенным Фронтом» — крупной политической организацией при Коммунистической партии Китая. По большому счету, « Объединенный Фронт » — это крупный PR-проект партии, занимающийся трансляцией идеалов партии в массы с особым фокусом на маргинализованных группах, меньшинствах и эмигрантах. «Объединенный Фронт» существует уже не одно десятилетие, но при Си Цзиньпине стал значительно влиятельнее, особенно за рубежом. Судя по интервью Чэнь Цзиньмэй, на которое ссылается Симона, «полицейский участок» в Праге существовал еще с 2018 года — и, возможно, успешно занимался слежкой за «преступниками» среди диаспоры.
«Волонтеры» и сотрудники полицейского участка, считает Симона, не могли работать «на полную ставку» — в Чехии не так много иммигрантов из Китая, чтобы обеспечить участок полноценной нагрузкой, и они вынуждены были найти стороннюю занятость. Это же помогло им с прикрытием: полицейские открыли небольшой ресторан китайской кухни, который функционировал и как само полицейское отделение. Номер ресторана наряду со 110 Симона обнаруживала практически в каждой статье о «полицейских центрах». Ресторан — удобное для подобного рода занятий место. Его легко найти, он доступен для связи и может служить своего рода центром эмигрантского сообщества и, конечно, служит хорошим фронтом. Видимо, так считают и полицейские в других странах: например, китайский «полицейский участок» в Сеуле тоже скрывался внутри крупного китайского ресторана Dongang Myungjoo. Оба ресторана — и в Праге, и в Сеуле — отличались практически полным отсутствием посетителей, нежеланием принимать бронирования и, судя по всему, не очень хорошей едой.
К сожалению, несмотря на возможность обнаружить сами «полицейские участки», гораздо сложнее отследить их активность и, что самое главное, жертв. Симона отмечает, что в ее работе судебным переводчиком для китайских иммигрантов в Праге она наблюдала тотальное недоверие к полиции и государственному аппарату в целом.
«Для них любое внимание со стороны государства явно приносит дискомфорт, — рассказывает Симона. — Даже если им нужна была помощь и мы готовы были ее оказать, они предпочитали всё отрицать».
Поэтому узнать о преследованиях диссидентов, шпионаже, шантаже и насильственном возвращении граждан в Китай из первых рук практически невозможно.
О таких «достижениях», впрочем, иногда рассказывает и сама полиция и официальные китайские источники. Так, в 2022 году китайская полиция арестовала 634 тысячи подозреваемых по новому закону о мошенничестве, при этом 210 тысяч из них «убедили вернуться» в Китай, где они подверглись уголовному наказанию. Safeguard Defenders предполагают, что методы убеждения обычно включают в себя шантаж и угрозы, а также давление на членов семьи в Китае, вплоть до их арестов или тюремных заключений.
В 2022 году китайская полиция арестовала 634 тысячи подозреваемых по новому закону о мошенничестве, при этом 210 тысяч из них «убедили вернуться» в Китай
На данный момент расследования в странах, где были обнаружены китайские «полицейские участки», продолжаются; а их сотрудники достаточно успешно заметают за собой следы, удаляя публикации, обсуждения и чаты, в которых могли подниматься вопросы о «полицейских участках», говорит Симона.
«Кто-то очень активно занимается чисткой информации. Если бы я не сохраняла статьи в internet archive, у меня не осталось бы ни одного доказательства».
Чем закончатся государственные расследования и кто может понести ответственность — неизвестно, зато ясно, что в борьбе за укрепление власти и статуса глобальной державы, не скованной даже государственными границами, Си Цзиньпин вряд ли будет готов смириться с потерей «зарубежных полицейских участков», и, возможно, с ними или их альтернативами мы столкнемся еще не раз.
