Two weeks after the Prigogine rebellion, it is time to draw some conclusions. First of all, claims that the mutiny was completely unpredictable are false: many commentators have been saying for months that a prolonged escalation between the Ministry of Defense and the Wagner group will lead to a dramatic denouement. Of course, it was difficult to foresee that the PMC would go for the capture of Russian cities, but here something appeared that was clear to Prigozhin, but not obvious to outside observers. He took advantage of the absence of significant troops in the front-line rear regions (primarily in Rostov-on-Don) to occupy the virtually empty territory without much resistance.
Wagner & Co.: did Prigozhin have any associates in power?
One can hardly agree that Prigozhin, as many now say, had some "influential allies in power." The fact that he succeeded only in the initial part of the plan and nothing of the subsequent steps just says the opposite – that there were no allies, and he simply took everyone by surprise on the night from Friday to Saturday, when the leadership of law enforcement agencies is everywhere far from working condition. For example, General Surovikin is listed as Prigozhin's “companion”, as one might assume, mainly because Prigozhin once praised Surovikin aloud. But in fact, Surovikin's Aerospace Forces were the only ones who really resisted the march of mercenaries. Actually, all the fuss formally arose due to the fact that, according to Prigozhin himself, PMC Wagner was attacked from the air, by the forces of Surovikin's subordinates. In response, the Prigozhinites shot down the Surovikites in the air. Good "putsch allies".
The fact that Prigozhin succeeded only in the first steps means that he did not have any influential allies.
Rumors about some kind of "arrest" or persecution of Surovikin still have no real evidence. If some events were carried out with him, then, most likely, due to the fact that he did not cope with the task of bombing the Wagnerites from the air. But it cannot be said that he did not try, and his air force suffered considerable losses in a very short period. In short, the strangest "alliance" imaginable.
In reality, it is very difficult to imagine that one of those in power could seriously side with Prigozhin. Firstly, they all perfectly understood the balance of power and the doom of the Wagnerian rebellion. Taking into account the fact that some of the militants remained in the camps and did not take part in the rebellion, and some had to be left in Rostov-on-Don to control the occupied territories, the number of participants in the "march to Moscow" could not be more than several thousand. With such a number of rebels, the federal forces, who were waiting for them on the outskirts of Moscow, would have coped. This was understood by everyone in the government offices.
Secondly, people in power, unlike the active inhabitants of the Internet, are well aware of who Prigozhin is, and have no illusions about his rhetoric about “justice”, “fighting corruption”, etc. Prigogine is first of all an unprincipled liar. It is necessary not to control the head at all in order to trust him even for a gram and take his rhetoric seriously. In addition, he is well known for his love of the game without any rules at all. What prize will the one who will take his side get? The question is rhetorical. But the risks are huge – everyone knows well what Putin's anger is.
Although the topic of “conspiracy in the corridors of power in support of Prigozhin” is now in vogue, all these conversations are extremely frivolous, and there certainly has not been a single successful conspiracy in history where the conspirators would start an armed uprising away from the capitals, in Rostov-on-Don. Such a “conspiracy against the authorities” at the maximum distance from the actual location of power is absolutely meaningless – one could have started even with Magadan.
Survival game: why did Prigozhin start all this?
Yes, because he did not have a goal to take power. He had one goal – to save his own skin. Apparently, he received some information about his upcoming liquidation – I don’t know in what form it could happen: in the form of an arrest or something worse (Putin has a wide range of tools in this regard) – and decided to be ahead of the curve by creating hurt himself in the form of quickly captured territories in southern Russia. Actually, their too quick capture and provoked many to suspicion of a "conspiracy within the government." But the real explanations here are much simpler. First of all, all the main forces were at the front; and besides, it is enough to remember any Russian coup – our security forces always react to any unforeseen events slowly, this is the norm.
Why did the special services miss Prigozhin's blitzkrieg? They were too focused on the “external enemy” and missed the internal one, and besides, everyone was well aware of the personal mandate for the activities of the Wagnerites from Putin himself, and no one suspected that Prigozhin would be able to personally challenge him.
Prigogine's calculation came true. Putin was so frightened by the loss of control over the territories and the likelihood of fighting for Moscow – and, to top it off, the prospect of storming Rostov-on-Don, that he agreed (for now) to any conditions for Prigogine to stop immediately. Putin had to stop everything very quickly, because every day that the armed confrontation inside the country dragged on incredibly hit his authority. And so, as they say, quickly raised is not considered to be fallen. If Prigozhin really sought some changes in the management of the army and the country, then he would use his opportunities to put pressure on Putin: to gain a foothold in Rostov (in his own words, "claw"), to blackmail, to bargain. I repeat once again: the storming of Rostov-on-Don would be completely unthinkable for Putin. But Prigogine was quite satisfied with the guarantees he received.
Prigogine had serious leverage, but at the first opportunity he was satisfied with the guarantees offered to him
Did he have any far-reaching plans beyond personal salvation? If so, it was quickly revealed that they were castles in the sand. It seems that Prigozhin was greatly dizzy by the fact that he had his own media empire and a troll factory – he received a rare opportunity among those in power to inflate his own figure in the PR field and, from an excess of publicity, imagined himself great. Having no experience in the apparatus (contrary to the image of the omnipotent inflated in the media, Prigozhin was never admitted to real decision-making bodies, he simply carried out separate instructions), he apparently decided that publicity is equivalent to the capabilities of the apparatus. As it turned out, this is not so – there were no obvious transitions to his side.
Moreover, Putin quickly explained to Prigozhin where the source of funding for the PMC Wagner came from. And, as it turned out, it predictably sat on full budget support, there were no powerful independent financial sources there. This device turned out to be quite easy to pull out of the socket. This is precisely why both Prigozhin and the Wagnerites have now been forced to quiet down – they do not have an independent hardware and financial base.
However, having won a quick apparatus victory, Putin nevertheless received a crushing blow to the prestige of his entire system. Among the nomenklatura and business, perhaps for the first time, there was a collective realization that Putin in reality does not control the situation in the country at all, and unexpected problems and challenges can come out from where they were not expected. His authority has always rested on the fact that he “solves problems” in one way or another, and even more so, he keeps under complete control the situation in the sphere of the notorious security, which was presented as his main “horse” for the last quarter of a century and for the sake of which Russians, including those with power and money, forced to say goodbye to all their rights and independence.
And it turned out according to the classics – no freedom, no security. Putin's system has spawned uncontrollable armed thugs and territory of lawlessness, which now may manifest itself God knows where and how. For the first time since 1943, entire Russian cities have been taken over by outsiders—including Russia's 11th largest city, Rostov-on-Don, the military capital of the country's south. For more than a day, the country was dominated by a feeling of complete uncertainty and helplessness of the authorities. In Moscow, they began to install machine-gun nests for "meeting the enemy" – for the first time since 1941. Ironically, a machine-gun nest at the exit from the Moscow Ring Road in the Yasenevo area appeared a few hundred meters from the obelisk with the inscription "Here in 1941 passed the South-Western border of the Moscow defense zone." The weakness of Putin's system of power during these hours was obvious to everyone. As well as the fact that the cult of armed men who spit on the rule of law, created personally by Putin, turned against him.
Putin's system has spawned uncontrolled armed thugs and a territory of lawlessness
These feelings will not be forgotten – Russia is extremely puzzled by what happened and began to say goodbye to Putin's image as a strong leader. All this does not fit into the picture of “security”, “protection” and “full control over the situation” that Putin’s propaganda has been painting for many years. Even regular viewers of Russian TV began to actively say that "something is wrong." Sharp reversals in propaganda rhetoric cause particular harm to the positions of the authorities: negative coverage of the Wagnerites, whom the authorities only yesterday raised with their own hands and nurtured as “heroes”, confuses people and causes only embarrassment. Propaganda works effectively when it gradually drives a certain idea into people's heads – sharp reversals of position reduce trust.
All current processes will certainly contribute to further erosion of power. It may not happen soon and all at once. But the undermining of Putin's authority and trust in him is another powerful blow to the foundations of the system in a chain of other blows (military defeats, difficulties in the army, the economy, sanctions), which in the end will inevitably lead to the breakdown of the system simply according to the elementary laws of physics.
What has broken in the minds of Putin's nomenklatura? Until recently, they believed that Putin and his entourage, although they make gross mistakes and create difficulties, nevertheless, on the whole, ensure the stability of the system, and many considered it possible to invest in it – to build a business, a career, look for ways to survive, and even try to work for development away from the Western world. It seems that the economy is “restoring”, we are “surviving” the sanctions, instead of the USA and Europe there are some India and China. You can make good money on import substitution. We'll live somehow, they thought! And then suddenly a signal – this whole system, based on lawlessness and violence, can suddenly break through somewhere, and the appearance of stability will collapse. But what if Prigozhin dug in in Rostov and went to storm Moscow, and a real civil war would begin? And what if the Chinese troops take and occupy some eastern territories like this, because all Russian units were transferred to Ukraine? But what if NATO, seeing how Putin faltered, decides to act harder on him? And what if someone else with weapons in their hands – and now, "thanks" to Putin's passion for militarism and aggression, there are more than ever many of them – decides to arrange something similar again, and this time will already find allies in power?
A swarm of these “what ifs” is now buzzing in the brains of Putin’s nomenklatura, paralyzing the desire to do something to strengthen the system. If someone had this desire before June 23, now everyone there has become very sad. Akela missed. It makes no sense to plow for the success of this system, it is much weaker than it seemed. Of course, all this will accelerate the weakening of the Putin regime.
Potato saved: what is the real role of Lukashenka
Most likely, Alexander Lukashenko was needed by the Kremlin solely as a negotiator comfortable for both sides – in view of the intensity of events, it would be difficult for Putin and Prigozhin to speak directly, and Putin rushed to look for such a negotiator from the morning of June 24 (before Lukashenka, he called the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but they probably refused such a role). As expected, Prigozhin and the Wagnerites did not go to Belarus, and, apparently, they will not go – Lukashenka helped to extinguish the instability in Russia (which directly threatened him too), but he probably would not want to host thousands of heavily armed thugs.
Putin, of course, will not forgive Prigozhin for the rebellion and the words “the president was deeply mistaken, no one is going to turn himself in at his request,” and will try to destroy him, but now he does not want to excite public opinion too much and does not fully understand the residual potential of resistance of the Wagnerites, so it will most likely last. In the meantime, there is a massive processing of the brains of Russians in the state media on the topic that Wagner is very bad. It is worth assuming that Prigozhin will try to hide in some third dictatorial country, but there is no problem for Putin to get him. Now the FSB is also organizing a detailed profiling of the entire personnel of the Wagnerites, trying to win over the least loyal to Prigozhin, and those who are considered dangerous in terms of lack of control and the likelihood of participating in possible future rebellions will be cleared one way or another.
Now the FSB is trying to win over the mercenaries least loyal to Prigozhin
Most likely, Prigogine's days are numbered. It is not clear what he hoped for, warming up the conflict with the Ministry of Defense and, as a result, Putin. Apparently, indeed, his own PR opportunities overheated his brain. And, of course, the independent Russian and international media played their role, breathlessly commenting on his every sneeze.
The failure of the mutiny and Prigozhin's flight from the political scene cast a foolish light on the arguments that the Russian democrats supposedly should have "supported" his mutiny. The democratic opposition seems to be offering society a different model of life – the rule of law, the rule of law and democratic institutions instead of the arbitrariness of armed thugs. And then – to support the bandits in order to establish democracy? .. How do you then differ from all this Putin's pack, living according to gangster concepts and imposing the "right of the strong" on the whole world? And these people reproached Yeltsin for something else in connection with the events of 1993 and 1996. And even if – purely hypothetically – Prigogine won, why would he need you? As Gandalf said of Sauron: "He does not share power."
Candidate from the people: how Russians support Prigozhin's rebellion
There is a lot of speculation on this topic now, fueled by numerous shots of warm greetings to the Wagnerites from the residents of Rostov-on-Don. In reality, opinion polls do not show much sympathy for Prigozhin, and in general, those who supported him, rather, under the influence of propaganda, considered him a kind of “conscientious patriot” and were not at all ready for rebellious actions. As for the frames of popular greetings to the Wagner militants, the number of people present there is disproportionately smaller and there were huge queues to leave Rostov on the morning of June 24, and even a march in support of Alexei Navalny in Rostov-on-Don, which took place in January 2021 . So do not exaggerate the scale of Prigozhin's "popular support".
The number of people who greeted the Wagnerites is incommensurably less than the queues for leaving Rostov on the morning of June 24
A more interesting factor should be considered the passivity of administrative structures and the population in protecting Putin's government from the onset of militants. But the passivity of support for the authorities is not news to anyone who at least somehow analyzes what is happening in Russia. Dig a little deeper than Putin's overall "support" figures, and you'll see that the prevailing attitude towards him is neutral-positive, and those who love him are also not ready to run to die for him – just look at the lack of enthusiasm for signing up for war. volunteers, despite the huge amount of money offered by the standards of most of the country's territory.
This is how everything will work one day: Putin will have multiple crises in the war, in the economy, within his own system, and at some point no one will run to defend him. This moment should be brought as close as possible, trying to work on all the necessary fronts: on the battlefield, increasing sanctions pressure, in the field of information work with Russians and changing public opinion in the country. By the way, firm unconditional support for the war (“definitely support”) in June dropped to a minimum since the start of a full-scale invasion, according to the Levada Center, to 40% against a peak of 53% in March 2022.
This process will continue. You can contribute to it by continuing your information work with Russians fooled by propaganda. For Putin, public opinion is extremely important. Realizing what a powerful blow to his authority he missed, he did not give a damn about the usual leadership style of recent years and rushed to hug the people, saving his image. Путин понимает важность поддержки общественного мнения, поэтому он так и не объявляет второй волны мобилизации (хотя она ему очень-очень нужна), так и не закрывает границы и не блокирует YouТube. Важно, чтобы это поняли вы: среди антипутинских и антивоенных россиян чрезмерно распространены упаднические настроения и неверие в возможность что-то изменить в сознании людей. Можно изменить. Надо работать.
Ситуация для Путина резко ухудшается. На фронте наступательных операций он уже совершать не в состоянии и будет только терять оккупированные территории. В экономике власти стоят перед перспективой повышения налогов и ставки ЦБ, ростом инфляции, полным проеданием резервов или экономией расходов. И тут такой подарок — живая иллюстрация для всех россиян, что путинское правление заканчивается противостоянием вооруженных бандитов на улицах наших городов, где жертвой может стать любой. Альтернативой этому вооруженному беспределу может быть только возврат к демократической форме правления и ответственной перед людьми власти. Путин пугал россиян хаосом и беспределом, а в итоге его правление породило самый невиданный хаос и беспредел. Всё это надо объяснять людям, и сейчас для этого есть отличная возможность.
