On August 31, Gazprom temporarily suspended gas supplies to Europe via Nord Stream for maintenance, initially promising to resume them in three days. On September 2, before the date of the planned opening of the gas pipeline, Gazprom announced the postponement of the deadline for an indefinite period. The company attributed the shutdown to an "oil leak" and the need for maintenance, which it said required "specialized repair conditions." Siemens Energy, the manufacturer of turbines for Nord Stream, said that such a leak is not a reason to stop gas supplies and can be fixed on the spot. European politicians in response to this reacted sharply, as expected – for example, European Commission representative Eric Mamer wrote that the shutdown of gas supply "for false reasons" once again proves that Russia is an unreliable supplier and prefers to burn gas instead of fulfilling contracts.
History of gas blackmail
During the war in Ukraine, this is not the first time that Russia has stopped or reduced gas supplies to Europe. On June 1, Gazprom suspended gas supplies to Denmark and Germany due to the fact that Ørsted and Shell Energy Europe refused to pay for gas in rubles. Since June 14, Gazprom has sharply reduced the volume of deliveries by almost 75%, explaining this by the fact that due to sanctions, Siemens failed to return the turbine after maintenance. And on July 11, Gazprom tried shutting down Nord Stream for 10 days, citing the same “need for maintenance.” Even then, German Economy Minister Robert Habek suggested that the stoppage of gas supplies could be permanent, called on European countries to be ready for this and accused Russia of using gas "as a weapon." He may have been right, in both cases.
Russia's use of natural gas as a foreign policy tool and weapon has long been discussed in political and academic circles and has acquired its own name – "pipeline politics" (pipeline politics). One of the first major cases of "pipeline policy" discussed in the scientific literature took place in 1997 under Yeltsin. At that time, the entry of the Czech Republic into NATO was in the active stage of negotiations, and Russia, in its best traditions, was not slow to turn to threats. In 1997, Nikolai Ryabov, the ambassador of the Russian Federation to the Czech Republic, stated that "Russia will not tolerate a weakening of its influence in Eastern Europe", and the entry of the Czech Republic into NATO could "harm economic relations with Russia". He clarified what he meant, among other things, "fundamental agreements on gas supplies." Then the escalation did not happen, Russia settled on threats, and Ryabov himself eventually even changed his rhetoric, saying that Russia "respects the decision of the Czech Republic."
One of the first cases of "pipeline policy" took place in 1997 under Yeltsin
However, in the future, Russia will stop dwelling on threats. For the first time in practice, the "pipeline policy" will be applied in the mid-2000s – as a tool in an attempt to reintegrate the CIS around the Russian Federation. Vladimir Putin, already seized with ideas about the revival of the Empire, decided to use control over the energy resources of the region to ensure economic dominance and, subsequently, the integration of the post-Soviet space. At that time, there were many factors for the effectiveness of such an instrument – the rising prices for gas and oil turned hydrocarbons into the "gold reserve" of the Russian Federation, and control over them – through Gazprom and Rosneft loyal to Putin – was concentrated in the presidential hands.
At the same time, Ukraine came under attack for the first time, almost in the first months after the Orange Revolution of 2004-2005. Putin really did not want to allow a revolution, and, quite likely, even considered the use of force. However, this did not happen then, but the so-called gas conflict followed: Gazprom announced its intention to raise prices for gas supplied to Ukraine to "market" European prices – almost three times. Ukraine refused these conditions – in response, Russia cut off gas supplies. At that time, however, Ukraine was the main transit country for Russian supplies to Europe – fearing a symmetrical response, Russia was forced to make a number of concessions, and the conflict ended with the signing of a new, "compromise" agreement. Even then, in 2005, this conflict made some Eastern European countries worried about the reliability of Russian supplies and started talking about looking for new partners.
Already in 2005, the countries of Eastern Europe questioned the reliability of Russian supplies and started talking about finding new partners.
Similar conflicts occurred with other countries. They happened to Belarus, which is now perceived as the closest friend of Russia. To ensure control over transit and expand political influence, Putin decided to use the same “weapon” against his western neighbor. Using threats of higher prices, as well as the suspension of supplies, including in winter, Russia and Gazprom secured the purchase of a stake in the pipeline network in Belarus.
Of course, these conflicts have not bypassed Western politicians and experts. Thus, the American scholar and one of the ideologists of liberal interventionism, Robert Kagan, wrote in his book The Return of History: “Russian leaders realize that [the EU’s energy dependence] gives them the opportunity to achieve Europe’s loyalty to their own behavior.” And the American economist Irwin Stelzer noted that one can consider Gazprom as anything other than an instrument of Russian influence either out of “extreme naivety” or “acute need”.
Based on all practical cases, an unequivocal consensus has developed in energy security studies: Russia is quite capable of using its energy resources (and is using it) as a weapon. In security science, the use of this "weapon" is divided into several stages, explains Karen Smith Stegen, Ph.D. in political science. Preparation and application usually consists of three steps. First, the consolidation of resources in the hands of the authorities; secondly, obtaining control over transit; thirdly, threats, price gouging and supply cuts, and finally, the result – or the fourth stage – obtaining concessions and concessions.
How the gas "weapon" of the Kremlin works
Putin began to consolidate almost immediately. The Yukos affair can be considered one of the first steps: the liquidation of the company and the transfer of assets to state-controlled Rosneft followed precisely the goal of consolidation. The problems of the gas sector were resolved even more directly: after the lifting of antitrust restrictions in 2007, Gazprom simply bought out the remaining private corporations.
Russia established control over transit in several steps: firstly, by immediately moving to threats against transit countries, for example, Belarus, and secondly, by building its own routes, in particular, Nord Stream 1, as well as the currently frozen moment of Nord Stream 2, thirdly, using threats: we have been observing price increases and interruptions in supplies since 1997 and to this day. The fourth and final stage – concessions – Russia is still waiting for. Today, concessions from Europe, which Russia would like, relate primarily to sanctions. In speeches about gas and energy, Putin focuses on them.
And despite the fact that it is probably not worth expecting such serious concessions and the cessation of sanctions in response to the Russian "pipeline policy" in the near future, it is impossible to ignore the new gas conflict. Like it or not, Europe really depends on Russian gas: in recent years, 40% of all gas consumed by Europe was supplied from Russia. Despite European plans to restructure the economy and phase out Russian gas (the so-called REPowerEU plan), change will take time . The plan provides for a complete phase-out of Russian gas only by 2030. But the policy of the Russian Federation is already causing a crisis.
Serious concessions and cessation of sanctions in response to the Russian “pipeline policy” should not be expected
Due to the current cut in gas supply, prices in Europe have risen by at least 30%, and the euro has fallen below the dollar for the first time. Moreover, due to the approach of winter and due to European restrictions on oil , gas prices may continue to rise further, putting additional pressure on politicians and ordinary residents. At the same time, it is important to understand that the jump in gas prices has affected not only countries traditionally dependent on Russian gas, but also the whole of Europe. In general, only a few European countries are relatively independent of Russian supplies – the Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, as well as France and Great Britain. Even they, however, are facing rising energy prices.
Political consequences of blackmail
This, of course, could not but affect the political climate in Europe. Thus, the European consulting agency Verisk Maplecroft, which specializes in risk analysis, predicts that the winter of 2022 is likely to bring a significant increase in protest movements to European nations. This dynamic is already being observed in the UK, where discontent is growing significantly against the backdrop of the so-called cost of living crisis. Mass protests are also observed in other countries. In Germany, a left-wing opposition recently demonstrated in favor of a gas price ceiling and against a planned increase in energy prices from October.
The winter of 2022 could bring a significant increase in protest movements to European nations
Meanwhile, against the backdrop of protests and general discontent, as often happens during social and economic crises, populist ideas and parties are gaining momentum. Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi said in a speech to the G7 back in the summer that Western countries should avoid the mistakes of the past and prevent the growth of populism against the background of the coming energy crisis. Apparently, Draghi's concerns were justified, but it seems that they failed to prevent a new wave of populism. Thus, in the upcoming elections in Italy, scheduled for the end of September, George Meloni, the chairman of the Brothers of Italy, an extreme right-wing populist party that used to actively advocate for better relations with Russia, is predicted to win. Meloni's party, in addition to the traditional elements of the right-wing agenda, paid much attention in its election campaign to rising gas and energy prices and promised to find a quick solution to these problems.
A similar situation is observed in Sweden. In recent elections, the Swedish Democrats, a far-right populist party with roots in the far-right neo-Nazi Nordic Imperial Party, celebrated its biggest victory. With over 21%, the Democrats overtook the liberal-conservative Moderate Party for the first time in history and became the second most represented party, behind only the Social Democrats. The vote count in Sweden is still incomplete, and the two opposing coalitions are on par, but if the right-wing coalition wins in the end—and if the coalitions don't split and change—the Democrats will have a chance for the first time in government. Despite the fact that immigration remained a key theme of the Democratic campaign, in this election they paid special attention to high energy prices: after criticizing the ruling coalition for high taxes and excessive emphasis on wind energy, they promised to significantly reduce energy prices.
Doctor of International Relations, researcher at the European Center for the Study of Populism Bulent Kenes told The Insider that the "Democrats" took advantage of the socio-economic difficulties caused by rising energy prices, but, ultimately, this will not affect Sweden's policy towards the Putin regime.
“Despite the invasion of Ukraine and Sweden's bid for NATO membership due to the growing perception of this war as a direct security threat, the country's security and foreign policy did not occupy a place among the main topics of the election campaigns. Swedish parties on the right side of the political spectrum, including the Democrats, have always taken a pro-NATO stance and have given significant support to Sweden's recent bid for NATO membership. Thus, I do not see any risk of a major change in policy towards Russia, despite the fact that some prominent members of the Swedish Democrats were suspected of having special relations with the Putin regime.
What does this mean for Russia? Recently, in Europe, populist and far-right parties have been considered “useful fools” beneficial to Russia, sometimes openly pro-Putin. And Russia successfully used this – the former chairman of the Brothers of Italy, Matteo Salvini, negotiated funding with Russia, with which the Brothers advocated good relations. And the leader of the Austrian far-right Freedom Party, Heinz-Christian Strache, was seen in Ibiza in 2017 during negotiations with the “niece” of Russian millionaire Igor Makarov. It turned out to be a sham, but the Party of Freedom's interest in Russian funding, apparently, was sincere and long-term.
Populist and extreme right parties were considered beneficial to Russia as “useful fools”
On September 13, the US State Department declassified intelligence documents that since 2014, Russia has spent more than $300 million to interfere in foreign elections: lobbying for profitable politicians and parties, funding far-right think tanks, and supporting populist movements. This once again emphasizes that Russia is sincerely interested in supporting populist, pro-Russian and right-wing parties in Europe.
But will the growing popularity of right-wing and populist parties play into the hands of Russia now? Previously, this was an important lever of influence for the Kremlin. But after the invasion of Ukraine, the situation changed. For example, the "Brothers of Italy" radically changed their position. George Meloni condemned the war, promised support and the supply of weapons to Ukraine; and the party's earlier anti-institutional stance has shifted towards support for NATO. The same change has taken place in Belgium's previously moderately pro-Russian right-wing movements: Tom Van Griek, head of the right-wing and separatist Flemish Interest, has moved to criticize Belgium's underinvestment in the defense sector.
Perhaps the rise of populist parties will slightly undermine the status quo and weaken unity within Europe, but compared to a full-scale war in Europe, all this pales a little. Despite the resources spent by Russia and all possible levers of pressure aimed at undermining European politics, it has not been successful in this so far – and it seems that it will not succeed in the near future.
